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I. Introduction
Genetic testing is advancing at an unprecedented pace.1 Until
recently, the testing techniques available in the prenatal context
were invasive and risky.2 The introduction of non-invasive
prenatal testing (NIPT) in 2011 has dramatically reduced the
overall incidence of standard diagnostic procedures like
amniocentesis and chorionic villus sampling (CVS).3 Nevertheless,
the genetic information available to prospective parents (PPs)
1. See Ignatia B. Van den Veyver, Recent Advances in Prenatal Genetic
Screening and Testing, F1000RESEARCH, Oct. 28, 2016, at 3 (noting the
“unprecedented rapid evolution” of certain forms of genetic testing).
2. See id. at 5 (noting that non-invasive tests are a recent development).
3. See id. at 4 (noting that “likely because of intense marketing, many
women are being offered cffDNA screening, irrespective of a priori risk, and [as a
result] the number of diagnostic procedures performed has dramatically
declined”). According to Van den Veyver, NIPT has prompted many women to
forego confirmatory testing entirely. See id. at 5.
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today is still largely limited to targeted testing for severe
early-onset conditions.4 But the emergence of prenatal whole
genome sequencing (PWGS) will eliminate the barriers between
targeted testing and testing for everything.5 Soon, it will be
possible to interrogate an entire fetal genome.6 As PWGS
transforms the pregnancy experience, PPs can anticipate access to
an incredible amount of genetic information about their
offspring—from late-onset medical conditions like breast cancer, to
manageable medical conditions like hemochromatosis, to
non-medical traits like athletic ability, to aesthetic characteristics
like eye color.7 While some technical barriers remain, clinical
availability of prenatal whole genome sequencing (PWGS) is now
a question of “when,” not “if.”8 And by most accounts, “when” may
be in as few as five years.9
PWGS presages a paradigm shift.10 Genetic information will
become far more accessible, but its contents will be less

4. See id. at 6 (“Thus, until non-invasive tests become more accurate and
comprehensive, the growing trend of replacing diagnostic testing with cffDNA
screening comes at a cost of missed prenatal genetic diagnoses.”).
5. See Lisa Hui & Diana W. Bianchi, Recent Advances in the Prenatal
Interrogation of the Human Fetal Genome, 29 TRENDS GENETICS 84, 84–91 (2013)
(noting the increases in “overcom[ing] several major technical barriers to the
non-invasive assessment of the whole fetal genome”).
6. See id. (noting the increases in interrogating the human fetal genome).
7. Hemochromatosis is a commonly inherited condition caused by
mutations in the HFE gene that can be easily and effectively managed if
treatment is initiated early enough. See M.J. Burt et al., The Significance of
Haemochromatosis Gene Mutations in the General Population: Implications for
Screening, 43 BMJ 830, 835 (1998).
8. See Malorye Allison, Genomic Testing Reaches into the Womb, 31 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 595, 600 (2013) (noting the likelihood that whole genome
sequencing will soon be utilized).
9. See id. (suggesting eventual routinization of PWGS, but stating that
“[w]hether it’s 5, 10, or 20 years is more difficult to say”); Elaine R. Mardis, The
Impact of Next-Generation Sequencing Technology on Genetics, 24 TRENDS
GENETICS 133, 134 (2008) (stating that next-generation sequencing “will provide
a comprehensive picture of normal human genome variation in the next few
years”); John A. Robertson, The $1000 Genome: Ethical and Legal Issues in
Whole-Genome Sequencing of Individuals, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Summer 2003, at 35,
36 [hereinafter The $1000 Genome] (estimating the timeframe for clinical
availability of WGS at ten to fifteen years).
10. See Hui & Bianchi, supra note 5, at 84–91 (noting that PWGS will create
more data).

580

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 577 (2019)

understood.11 Indeed, even in professional populations genetic
literacy is low.12 Clinicians report feeling inadequately prepared to
order genetic tests, to interpret genetic results, and to counsel their
patients.13 Likely, their concerns are warranted.14 Genetics is an
entirely separate specialty from obstetrics and gynecology, and
surveys show that most OB/GYNs have received little or no
genetics training.15 To compound the problem, the United States is
facing a shortage of genetics experts.16 The number of clinical
geneticists (the specialists most directly involved with patient
care)17 is decreasing just as the volume of patients utilizing genetic
technologies is increasing.18 There is also a well-documented
11. See id. (“Whatever technological platform is eventually used to assess
the fetus, whether targeted or whole genome, data interpretation, storage, and
management will be major challenges for future clinicians and diagnostic
services.”).
12. Julia L. Piechan et al., NIPT and Informed Consent: An Assessment of
Patient Understanding of a Negative NIPT Result, 25 J. GENETIC COUNSELING
1127, 1135 (2016).
13. See Michelle J. Bayefsky et al., Views of American OB/GYNs on the
Ethics of Prenatal Whole-Genome Sequencing, 36 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 1250, 1253
(2016) (“Furthermore, a large majority of OB/GYNs believe that they will not have
sufficient resources to interpret and communicate PWGS results.”).
14. See id. (“Prenatal whole-genome sequencing will vastly increase the
amount of information we can learn about a fetus’s genome, which could have
far-reaching societal consequences.”).
15. See id. (noting the unfamiliarity of most OBGYNs with genetic data).
16. See Wynter K. Miller, Note, Trust and Anti-Trust: State-Based
Restrictions in Telemedicine, 50 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 1807, 1813 & nn.37–43
(2017) (“The United States is facing an impending healthcare crisis: there are not
enough doctors.”).
17. Judith A. Cooksey et al., The Medical Genetics Workforce: An Analysis of
Clinical Geneticist Subgroups, 8 GENETICS MED. 603, 603 (2006) (“MD clinical
geneticists comprise the primary medical specialist group trained and certified in
clinical genetics.”).
18. Clinical genetics has historically attracted fewer physicians than other
specialties. Further, the typical geneticist’s patient load “is substantially smaller
than that reported by physicians practicing in other specialties,” perhaps due in
part to differences in time allocation. Id. On average, geneticists allocate seven
hours to each new patient and three-and-a-half hours to follow-up. See V.L.
Hannig et al., Expansion of Genetic Services Utilizing a General Genetic
Counseling Clinic, 23 J. GENETIC COUNSELING 64, 64 (2014) (“[A]n average of 7 h
was spent on each new genetics patient (including all time spent by all
professionals) and 3.5 h on each follow up patient.”). By contrast, the average
pediatrician spends between eleven and twenty minutes with each patient; the
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shortage of Master’s-level genetic counselors.19 In short, the supply
of geneticists is insufficient to meet current demand, let alone
provide adequate counseling to the millions of PPs making
reproductive decisions each year.20 By necessity, geneticists will
not be the only professionals, or even the primary professionals,
offering genetic testing to PPs.21 Obstetricians and other prenatal
providers will need to act as genetic gatekeepers.22 How they
perform that role—what they say to patients and when they say
it—is the focus of this Article.23
This issue warrants attention because the implications of
PWGS are not limited to the medical landscape.24 PWGS is also
injecting new urgency into an entrenched political debate.25 For
well over a century, abortion has been one of the most radioactive
issues in America.26 Its legal status—specifically, the legality or
average internist spends twenty-six minutes. See David C. Dugdale et al., Time
and the Patient-Physician Relationship, 14 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. S34, S36
(1999) (discussing patient visit lengths); Gery P. Guy Jr. & Lisa C. Richardson,
Visit Duration for Outpatient Physician Office Visits Among Patients with Cancer,
8 J. ONCOLOGY PRACTICE 2s, 7s tbl.3 (2012) (comparing average time spent with
patients by oncologists (24.7 minutes) versus non-oncologists (21.1 minutes)).
19. See Benjamin E. Berkman & Michelle Bayefsky, Prenatal Whole Genome
Sequencing: An Argument for Professional Self-Regulation, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Jan.
2017, at 26, 26–27 (noting “the well-documented dearth of genetic counselors”).
In a comprehensive national survey of the genetics workforce, Cooksey et al.
found that geneticists rely heavily on genetic counselors with respect to patient
care. Indeed, most geneticists have three or more genetic counselors on staff, and
64% to 77% of geneticists report that genetic counselors see many or all of their
new patients. Cooksey et al., supra note 17, at 609.
20. See Berkman & Bayefsky, supra note 19, at 26–27 (noting that the
medical community lacks enough geneticists).
21. See id. (“[G]iven the well-documented dearth of genetic counselors, there
is reason for concern that doctors will have to rely on genetic counseling services
provided by the genetic testing companies themselves.”).
22. See id. (noting that prenatal providers will have to interact with genetic
testing companies to determine how to relay information to patients).
23. See infra Parts II–IV.
24. See Berkman & Bayefsky, supra note 19, at 26–28 (noting the interplay
between abortion and PWGS).
25. See id. (noting, among other arguments, that PWGS may lead to
arguments “that aborting affected fetuses amounts to disability discrimination”).
26. See Leigh Ann Caldwell, Abortion: A Polarizing, Emotional Debate 41
Years
After
Court
Ruling,
CNN
(Jan.
22,
2014)
https://www.cnn.com/2014/01/22/politics/abortion/index.html (last visited Jan. 6,
2019) (noting that abortion has remained a controversial issue for many years)
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illegality of its performance—stands as “the coveted jewel in the
political crown.”27 Roe v. Wade28 stands as a bulwark against
outright bans.29 Thus, the “general strategy” of pro-life advocates
has been to make abortion harder—“harder legally, financially,
emotionally, and practically.”30 Historically, pro-life legislators
sought to construct legal hardships by way of logistical
obstacles—e.g., mandatory waiting periods,31 hospital-admitting
privilege requirements,32 insurance coverage restrictions,33
state-mandated counseling,34 parental notification,35 and the

(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
27. CAROL SANGER, ABOUT ABORTION: TERMINATING PREGNANCY IN
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AMERICA xi (2017).
28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
29. See id. at 166–67 (stating that abortions cannot be criminalized in
certain situations).
30. See Sanger, supra note 27, at xi (describing the strategy of some pro-life
advocates).
31. In 1992, the Supreme Court upheld Pennsylvania’s 24-hour waiting
period under Roe’s undue burden standard. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887 (1992). Today, twenty-seven states require observance
of a waiting period between when a woman receives pre-abortion counseling and
when the abortion is performed. In fourteen states, the waiting period is of
sufficient duration (e.g., laws in Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South
Dakota, and Utah mandate a 72-hour waiting period) so as to require two
separate trips to the clinic. See An Overview of Abortion Laws, GUTTMACHER INST.,
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/overview-abortion-laws
(last
updated Apr. 1, 2019) (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (describing the abortion laws of
many states) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
32. See An Overview of Abortion Laws, supra note 31 (“19 states require an
abortion to be performed in a hospital after a specified point in the pregnancy.”).
33. See id. (“11 states restrict coverage of abortion in private insurance
plans.”).
34. See id. (“18 states mandate that women be given counseling before an
abortion.”).
35. See id. (“37 states require some type of parental involvement in a minor’s
decision to have an abortion.”).
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like.36 Though markedly effective in many cases,37 logistical
obstacles have nonetheless failed to secure for pro-lifers the
coveted jewel: Roe’s overturn.38 And so, the hardship construction
project continues.39
In this context, states have begun to legislate.40 In 1923,
Rudyard Kipling infamously described words as “the most
powerful drug used by mankind.”41 Perhaps in cognizance of the
power of words, physician speech has recently become a target for
anti-abortion regulation.42 Texas, for example, compels physicians
to warn pregnant women that an abortion may increase their risk

36. According to the Guttmacher Institute, nineteen states require abortions
to be performed in a hospital after a specified point in the pregnancy (usually
viability); eleven states restrict coverage of abortion in private insurance plans;
eighteen states mandate pre-abortion counseling; and thirty-seven states require
parental consent or notification. See An Overview of Abortion Laws, supra note 31
(providing an overview of abortion law in the United States).
37. Logistical obstacles tend to “have a dramatic impact on women who live
farthest from major metropolitan areas.” See Lisa R. Pruitt & Marta R. Vanegas,
Urbannormativity, Spatial Privilege, and Judicial Blind Spots in Abortion Law,
30 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 76, 79 (2015) (discussing the disproportionate
toll abortion restriction laws have on women who are both rural and poor); see
also Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Casey and the Clinic Closings: When
Protecting Health Obstructs Choice, 125 YALE L.J. 1428, 1449–50 (2016)
(assessing so-called TRAP laws (i.e., targeted regulation of abortion providers) in
the Casey framework and concluding that “the practical impact of these health
restrictions . . . is to dramatically shrink abortion providers’ infrastructure,
clos[e] clinics and disabl[e] doctors”).
38. See Caldwell, supra note 26 (noting that Roe has not been overturned).
39. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (noting that “construction”
projects continue).
40. See Woman’s Right to Know Act, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 171.012
(2003) (requiring certain warnings to be given prior to an abortion).
41. Rudyard Kipling, Surgeons and the Soul, in A BOOK OF WORDS 237, 237
(2007). A similar sentiment has guided the Supreme Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence. Perhaps most famously, Justice Louis Brandeis wrote in Whitney
v. California, “If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and
fallacies . . . the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.” 274
U.S. 357, 377 (1927). See also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (recognizing that “the theory of our Constitution” calls for
vigilance against attempts to stymie “free trade in ideas”); Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (“[F]reedom of thought protected by the First
Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the
right to refrain from speaking at all.”).
42. See Woman’s Right to Know Act, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 171.012
(2003) (requiring certain warnings to be given prior to an abortion).
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of developing breast cancer,43 despite an absence of medical
authority supporting the claim.44
South Dakota’s legislature decided that women seeking
abortions may be subject to “clouded judgement, and a willingness
to violate conscience.”45 The state thus compels physicians to warn
women that an abortion may increase their risk for suicidal
ideation and suicide.46 The medical evidence supporting a link
between abortion and negative mental health sequelae is similarly
lacking.47 More recently, states have begun to consider abortion
bans on the basis of fetal genetic abnormalities (ABGAs).48
These recent legislative attempts to regulate physician speech
were undertaken in response to emerging prenatal testing
technologies. In 2011, pregnant women in the United States gained
access to NIPT, a new technology that makes fetal genetic testing
easier than ever before.49 The first ABGAs were introduced near
43. See id. (“Consent to an abortion is voluntary and informed only if the
physician who is to perform the abortion informs the pregnant woman . . . [of] the
possibility of increased risk of breast cancer following an induced abortion and
the natural protective effect of a completed pregnancy in avoiding breast
cancer.”).
44. See Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists (ACOG), Committee
Opinion No. 434: Induced Abortion and Breast Cancer, 113 OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 1417, 1417 (2009), https://www.acog.org/-/media/CommitteeOpinions/Committee-on-GynecologicPractice/co434.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20190416T1638572043 (“[R]igorous recent studies
demonstrate no causal relationship between induced abortion and a subsequent
increase in breast cancer risk.”).
45. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2005) (“The Legislature further finds
that a woman seeking to terminate the life of her unborn child may be subject to
pressures which can cause an emotional crisis, undue reliance on the advice of
others, clouded judgment, and a willingness to violate conscience to avoid those
pressures.”).
46. See id. (listing the written notices that a doctor must provide to the
patient).
47. See Vignetta E. Charles et al., Abortion and Long-Term Mental Health
Outcomes: A Systematic Review of the Evidence, 78 CONTRACEPTION 436, 448–49
(2008) (“A clear trend emerges from this systematic review: the highest quality
studies had findings that were mostly neutral, suggesting few, if any, differences
between aborters and their respective comparison groups in terms of mental
health sequelae.”).
48. See infra notes 51–59 and accompanying text (discussing state
legislation attempting to restrict abortions).
49. See infra Part I (explaining how NIPT is less invasive and more cost
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instantaneously. Indeed, the national pro-life organization
Americans United for Life drafted and disseminated model
legislation for ABGAs a mere three months after NIPT became
clinically available.50 In 2013, North Dakota became the first state
to outlaw abortions “because the unborn child has been diagnosed
with either a genetic abnormality or a potential for a genetic
abnormality.”51 Within the last five years, twenty-two states have
considered similar legislation.52 Some states’ considerations have
been dogged. Missouri unsuccessfully attempted to pass some
version of an ABGA in 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017.53 In
January of 2018, Missouri State Senator David Sater and State
Representative Shamed Dogan introduced an ABGA identical to
the one that failed in 2017, which was identical to the one that

effective compared to other genetic testing methods).
50. See North Dakota Becomes First State to Limit Abortions Based on
Sex-Selection and Genetic Abnormalities Using AUL Model Legislation, AM.
UNITED FOR LIFE (Mar. 26, 2013), https://aul.org/2013/03/26/north-dakotabecomes-first-state-to-limit-abortions-based-on-sex-selection-and-geneticabnormalities-using-aul-model-legislation/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (praising
North Dakota for following AUL’s model legislation) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
51. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-04.1(1)(b) (2012).
52. See Mary A. Scott, Hard Choices: Where to Draw the Line on Limiting
Selection in the Selective Reduction of Multifetal Pregnancies, 100 MINN. L. REV.
1211, 1219 (2016) (listing the states that have considered legislation similar to
North Dakota); these states are Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, and Utah.
53. See Legislative Tracker, REWIRE NEWS, https://rewire.news/legislativetracker/law-topic/genetic-anomalies-abortion-ban/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2019)
(listing the status of ABGA legislation at the state level) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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failed in 2016.54 Currently, four states—Indiana,55 Louisiana,56
North Dakota,57 and Ohio58—have passed ABGAs, and four more
(counting Missouri) pre-filed 2018 proposals.59
In most respects, ABGAs are broad and punitive. In the case
of North Dakota, for example, “genetic abnormality” is defined as
“any defect, disease, or disorder that is inherited genetically. The
term includes any physical disfigurement, scoliosis, dwarfism,
Down syndrome, albinism, amelia, or any other type of physical or
mental disability, abnormality, or disease.”60 The penalties for
performing an abortion on genetic grounds include revocation of
medical license, a year in prison, a fine of $3,000, or any
combination of the three.61 In a technical sense, laws like North
54. Compare S.B. 724, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2018)
(introducing a companion bill to H.B. 1867 (2018) that is identical to S.B. 96
(2017)), with S.B. 96, 99th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2017) (introducing a
bill that was nearly identical to its predecessors, S.B. 802 and H.B. 1815, both of
which failed to pass in 2016).
55. See IND. CODE § 16-18-2-1.5 (2016) (presenting Indiana’s ABGA);
Indiana’s provision was passed as part of an omnibus bill that was enjoined, but
ostensibly the genetic abnormality ban remains in effect per the bill’s severability
provision. See Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r, Ind. State Dep’t
of Health, 273 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1043 (S.D. Ind. 2017) (granting preliminary
injunction that prohibits the State from enforcing a portion of the omnibus bill,
but does not affect § 16-18-2-1.5), aff’d, 896 F.3d 809 (7th Cir. 2018).
56. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.1.1 (2016) (presenting Louisiana’s ABGA).
57. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-04.1(1)(b) (2012) (presenting North
Dakota’s ABGA).
58. See 2017 Ohio Laws 29 (presenting Ohio’s ABGA). However, Ohio was
“enjoined from implementing and enforcing [the bill].” Preterm-Cleveland v.
Himes, 294 F. Supp. 3d 746, 758 (S.D. Ohio 2018); see Lauren del Valle, Ohio
Judge Blocks Legislation Preventing Abortions in Down Syndrome Cases, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/14/health/court-block-ohio-abortion-downsyndrome/index.html (last updated Mar.14, 2018, 8:58 PM) (last visited Apr. 16,
2019) (summarizing Preterm-Cleveland) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
59. See H.B. 4210, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2018) (introducing an
ABGA); S.B. 1430, 56th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2018) (same); S.B. 1867, 99th Gen.
Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2018) (same); H. 4833, 122nd Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (S.C. 2018) (same).
60. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-02(7) (2018) (emphasis added).
61. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-32-01 (2018) (defining penalties for
Class A misdemeanors); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 43-17-30.1 (2018) (defining
disciplinary action and grounds therefor).
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Dakota’s might have profound effects on the pregnancy experience
in that state. Imagine that a woman living in North Dakota
discovers she is pregnant. At her first prenatal exam, around the
tenth week of gestation, she furnishes her OB/GYN with a vial of
blood. Depending on the case load of her provider, and the
availability of a genetic counselor, she may or may not be told what
the blood test is for and the type of results she should be prepared
to receive. Given that there are five prenatal genetic counselors
currently employed in North Dakota, it is unlikely she will receive
anything close to sufficient counseling.62 Five to eight days after
her appointment, the woman gets a phone call. She is told that the
results of her blood test show there is an increased risk that she is
carrying a baby with a genetic condition called trisomy 18. She is
told that babies with trisomy 18 usually die in utero or within the
first month of life, but 5–10% live past their first year, often with
severe physical and intellectual disabilities.63 If the woman opts
for confirmatory testing, she will be scheduled for a CVS shortly
thereafter.64 But because she lives in North Dakota, if CVS gives a
definitive diagnosis of trisomy 18, the woman will be unable, as a
matter of state law, to terminate the pregnancy.65 The same would
be true if the baby had Down syndrome or trisomy 13.66
62. See Find a Genetic Counselor, NAT’L SOC’Y GENETIC COUNS.,
https://www.nsgc.org/page/find-a-gc-search (last visited Dec. 27, 2018) (setting
search criteria in the State/Province field for “North Dakota” and Types of
Specialization field for “Prenatal”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
HOME
REFERENCE,
63. See
Trisomy
18,
GENETICS
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/trisomy-18 (last visited Dec. 27, 2018)
(discussing the life expectancy and side-effects of individuals diagnosed with
Trisomy 18) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
64. See Chromosome Study from Amniotic Fluid and CVS, NAT’L CTR. FOR
BIOTECH. INFO., https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/gtr/tests/556622/ (last updated
July 4, 2018) (last visited Dec. 27, 2018) (providing an overview of the prenatal
test and listing the conditions that it diagnoses) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
65. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-04.1(1)(b) (2012) (“[A] physician may
not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion with knowledge that
the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely . . . [b]ecause the unborn child
has been diagnosed with either a genetic abnormality or a potential for a genetic
abnormality.”).
66. Trisomy 13 is a disorder associated with heart defects, brain or spinal
cord abnormalities, very small or poorly developed eyes, extra fingers or toes, an
opening in the lip or roof of the mouth, and weak muscle tone. See Trisomy 13,
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With PWGS’s inevitable clinical adoption, the above scenario
would change in two respects. First, the woman might receive a
positive prenatal diagnosis for any number of genetic disorders
above and beyond what NIPT can currently screen for, such as
Huntington’s disease (a fatal genetic disorder that usually
manifests after age 30), depression, Duchenne Muscular
Dystrophy, schizophrenia, breast cancer, malignant hyperthermia,
autism, diabetes, bipolar disorder—the list is near limitless.67
Second, though she might receive her diagnosis at the same time
(i.e., the tenth week of gestation), she would not need an
amniocentesis or CVS to confirm.68 All it would take is a blood
test.69 Under laws like North Dakota’s, regardless of the medical
severity of the condition, this woman would be legally barred from
pursuing an abortion.70
The demonstrated eagerness of pro-lifers to apply the “general
strategy” in ever-imaginative ways suggests that these first
attempts to control NIPT presage an equally vigorous legislative
response to PWGS. The genomic era will not be exempt from
abortion politics. As such, it is clearly not too soon to talk about
free speech, genetic gatekeepers, and PWGS. This Article explores
the First Amendment questions PWGS is likely to raise. It argues
that most of the foreseeable options for state intervention in
conversations between physicians and PPs about genetic
sequencing should trigger at least heightened scrutiny. Part I
provides an overview of the most recent advances in genetic
GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/trisomy-13# (last
visited Apr. 16, 2019) (providing an overview of Trisomy 13) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
67. See What Is Noninvasive Prenatal Testing (NIPT) and What disorders
HOME
REFERENCE,
Can
It
Screen
For?,
GENETICS
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/testing/nipt (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (providing
an overview of NIPT and discussing their limitations) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
68. See Greer Donley, Does the Constitution Protect Abortions Based on Fetal
Anomaly?: Examining the Potential for Disability-Selective Abortion Bans in the
Age of Prenatal Whole Genome Sequencing, 20 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 291, 297
(2013) (discussing trends and major breakthroughs in the field of whole-genome
sequencing).
69. See id. (explaining the benefits of whole-genome sequencing).
70. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
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testing. It assesses the ongoing impact of NIPT for providers and
patients and charts the course from NIPT to PWGS. Part II
establishes a foundational background for evaluating First
Amendment claims. Part II.A describes the development of First
Amendment jurisprudence, focusing on the doctrinal distinctions
between levels of judicial scrutiny. Part II.B explores historical
Supreme Court case law addressing professional speech. Part III
surveys the current legal landscape. Using a handful of recent
Circuit cases, Part III.A demonstrates that the legal frameworks
for assessing physician speech qua professional speech are
shambolic. Part III.B provides an overview of the most recent
Supreme Court ruling on professional speech in the 2018 case
National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra.71 Part
IV uses the material in Parts I–III to predict how legislative efforts
to limit reproductive decision-making are likely to manifest in the
PWGS context. Based on the case analyses in Part III, Part IV
identifies the Fourth and Eleventh Circuit approaches as the most
defensible for future judicial interventions. This Article concludes
that state-based restrictions on PWGS-related speech would be
vulnerable to First Amendment challenges and unlikely to survive
heightened judicial scrutiny.
II. Advancements in Prenatal Genetics
It has long been standard practice to offer genetic testing to
pregnant women.72 Until recently, amniocentesis and chorionic
villus sampling (CVS) were the available offerings.73 Both involve
71. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
72. ACOG recommends first trimester screening for all pregnant women. See
Committee Opinion No. 693: Counseling About Genetic Testing and
Communication of Genetic Test Results, AM. C. OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS,
https://www.acog.org/Clinical-Guidance-and-Publications/CommitteeOpinions/Committee-on-Genetics/Counseling-About-Genetic-Testing-andCommunication-of-Genetic-Test-Results (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) [hereinafter
Committee Opinion No. 693] (noting that prenatal screenings “have been routine
components of prenatal care for several decades”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
73. See What Is NIPT?, GENETICS EDUC. PROGRAMME (Dec. 18, 2017, 12:15
PM),
https://www.genomicseducation.hee.nhs.uk/news/item/403-what-is-nipt/
(last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (discussing the differences between NIPT and invasive
screening techniques) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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inserting a large needle into the uterus and both are associated
with high levels of fear and anxiety amongst pregnant women.74
Perhaps more critically, both tests are classified as diagnostic
rather than screening tests.75 And the distinction between
“diagnostic” and “screening” is more than semantic. Diagnostic
tests identify abnormalities with higher levels of confidence than
screening tests but are also more invasive and involve a
measurable risk of miscarriage.76
In the late 1990s, there was great interest in developing safer
alternatives to amniocentesis and CVS. In 1997, Dennis Lo and
Noemi Corbetta discovered circulating fetal DNA (i.e., cell-free
fetal DNA or “cffDNA”) in maternal plasma and serum.77 Their
discovery demonstrated that it was possible to screen the fetus for
genetic conditions using a blood sample from the mother.78 Prior to
1997, fetal DNA samples were obtainable only by invasive
extraction from the mother’s amniotic fluid (amniocentesis) or
placenta (CVS).79 Subsequent work by Lo et al. indicated that
plasma DNA analysis—now called NIPT—was less susceptible
than amniocentesis or CVS to false-positive results.80
74. See P. Sarkar et al., Maternal Anxiety at Amniocentesis and Plasma
Cortisol, 26 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 505, 506 (2006) (discussing the physiological
effect that amniocentesis has on pregnant women).
75. See CTR. FOR GENETICS EDUC., FACT SHEET 26: DIAGNOSTIC TESTS DURING
PREGNANCY 1–2 (2018).
76. The risk of miscarriage occurs at a rate of .22% and .25% for CVS and
amniocentesis, respectively. See Marion S. Verp, Prenatal Genetic Screening and
Diagnostic Testing, in PRENATAL & PREIMPLANTATION DIAGNOSIS: THE BURDEN OF
CHOICE 18–22 (Joann Paley Gast & Marion S. Verp eds., 2015); ACOG, Practice
Bulletin No. 162: Prenatal Diagnostic Testing for Genetic Disorders, 127
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY e108, e111–12 (2016).
77. See Y.M. Dennis Lo et al., Presence of Fetal DNA in Maternal Plasma
and Serum, 350 LANCET 485, 486–87 (1997) (discussing the results of the
experiment).
78. See id. at 485 (discussing the implications of discovering cffDNA).
79. See Rossa W.K. Chiu et al., Non-Invasive Prenatal Assessment of Trisomy
21 by Multiplexed Maternal Plasma DNA Sequencing: Large Scale Validity Study,
2011 BMJ 342, 342 (2011) (discussing the available methods for prenatal
diagnosis of trisomy 21).
80. See Y.M. Dennis Lo et al., Rapid Clearance of Fetal DNA from Maternal
Plasma, 64 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 218, 223 (1999) (discussing the benefits of
plasma DNA analysis).
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The discovery of cffDNA has drastically altered the pregnancy
experience. Today, invasive diagnostic tests are rarely a first-line
offer.81 In most cases, amniocentesis and CVS are offered
selectively for reasons like advanced maternal age or an abnormal
screening result, or upon explicit patient request.82 Instead, access
to fetal genetic information that once required an invasive
outpatient procedure—as well as a small but cognizable risk of
fetal injury or loss—is now attainable with a simple blood test.83
A. From Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing . . .
Non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) is technically classified
as a screening method (versus a diagnostic test).84 But it offers “an
information load approaching that of invasive diagnostic genetic
tests.”85 Since its clinical introduction in 2011,86 a handful of
commercial providers have established a robust market for NIPT.87
81. See
Amniocentesis,
MAYO
CLINIC
(Mar.
8,
2019),
https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/amniocentesis/about/pac-20392914
(last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (explaining the circumstances in which amniocentesis
may be appropriate) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
82. Cf. EMILY OSTER, EXPECTING BETTER: WHY CONVENTIONAL PREGNANCY
WISDOM IS WRONG—AND WHAT YOU REALLY NEED TO KNOW 121 (2014) (noting
that even given explicit patient requests, physicians and insurers are often
reluctant to provide invasive testing to women under 35).
83. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.
84. See Mollie A. Minear et al., Noninvasive Prenatal Genetic Testing:
Current and Emerging Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues, 16 ANN. REV. GENOMICS
& HUM. GENETICS 369, 371 (2015) (stating that clinical guidelines emphasize that
NIPT is a screening test and discussing recommendations by some professional
societies to change the abbreviation to NIPS). Non-Invasive Prenatal Diagnosis
(NIPD) also refers to the same technique.
85. Id. at 370.
86. Hong Kong was the first to offer clinical access to NIPT in August 2011.
It was available in the U.S. in October 2011. See Megan Allyse et al., Non-Invasive
Prenatal Testing: A Review of International Implementation and Challenges, 7
INT’L J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 113, 114 (2015) (discussing the origins and
commercialization of NIPT).
87. The global market value for NIPT reached an estimated $1.19 billion in
2015. See Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing Market to Gain from Enhanced Demand
in End-Use Industries Till 2025: Grand View Research, ABNEWSWIRE (Mar. 30,
2017), http://www.abnewswire.com/pressreleases/noninvasive-prenatal-testingmarket-to-gain-from-enhanced-demand-in-enduse-industries-till-2025-grandview-research-inc_107221.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (highlighting the
growth of the NIPT market) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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The leading U.S.-based providers have proprietary informatics on
their respective products,88 but in terms of content, NIPT panels
are roughly comparable. NIPT generally screens for the three most
common trisomies,89 certain sex chromosome abnormalities90 and
microdeletions,91 and select inherited diseases.92 By some
North America holds the largest revenue share at 47%. See Allyse et al., supra
note 86, at 115 (providing market share statistics); GRAND VIEW RESEARCH,
NON-INVASIVE PRENATAL TESTING (NIPT) MARKET ANALYSIS (2016),
http://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/noninvasive-prenatal-testi
ng-market.
88. For an expanded discussion and comparison of the different approaches
for conducting NIPT and the various bioinformatics platforms for post-hoc data
analysis, see Errol R. Norwitz & Brynn Levy, Noninvasive Prenatal Testing: The
Future Is Now, 6 REVS. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 48, 56 (2013) (“Each entity
utilizes a unique and proprietary algorithm for interpretation of the genetic
data.”). For an overview of the NIPT intellectual property landscape, see Ashwin
Agarwal et al., Commercial Landscape of Noninvasive Prenatal Testing in the
United States, 33 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 521, 524–27 (2013) (identifying active
patents with claims covering uses of cffDNA for prenatal genetic testing and
discussing ongoing patent litigation).
89. NIPT screening is widely available for Down syndrome (trisomy 21),
Patau syndrome (trisomy 13), and Edwards syndrome (trisomy 18). Trisomies 9
and 16 are also included on NIPT panels, but less commonly. See NIPT Education
for
Health
Care
Professionals—FAQ,
ILLUMINA,
https://www.illumina.com/clinical/reproductive-genetic-health/nipt/healthcareproviders.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (screening for trisomies 13, 18, and 21,
but not screening for trisomies 9 or 16) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
90. For example, monosomy X (Turner syndrome), Klinefelter syndrome (47,
XXY), Triple X syndrome, and Jacob’s syndrome (47, XYY). See id. (listing the
conditions that NIPT can identify).
91. Microdeletions are chromosome deletions that occur randomly (e.g.,
regardless of genetic risk factors, maternal age, or race) and can (but do not
always) produce negative effects. NIPT panels screen for the 5 most common
microdeletions: 22q11.2 syndrome (DiGeorge syndrome), 1p36 syndrome, 15q11.2
syndrome (Angelman syndrome and Prader-Willi syndrome), 4p-syndrome
(Wolf-Hirschhorn syndrome), and 5p-syndrome (Cri du Chat syndrome). See
Microdeletion: The Genetic Disorder You’ll Want to Know About Before Birth,
WHAT TO EXPECT, https://www.whattoexpect.com/pregnancy/microdeletion/ (last
updated Nov. 11, 2018) (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (listing the types of
microdeletions that NIPT can identify) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
92. In May 2017, Natera announced the launch of a new NIPT test
(“Vistara”) capable of screening for 30 single-gene mutations, including Noonan
syndrome, osteogenesis imperfecta, craniosynostosis syndromes, achondroplasia,
and Rett syndrome. See Natera, Inc. Announces Launch of Vistara Single-Gene
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estimates, NIPT screening reduces the need for invasive testing by
as much as 90%,93 and greatly improves overall pregnancy
management.94 Early clinical experiences with NIPT have been
positive,95 and reinforced by aggressive marketing practices,
consumer demand for NIPT is strong.96 Intuitively, it is
Mutation NIPT, NATERA (May 8, 2017), https://www.natera.com/pressreleases/natera-inc-announces-launch-vistara-single-gene-mutation-nipt
(last
visited Apr. 16, 2019) (discussing Vistara’s expanded capabilities compared to
other NIPT) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
93. See Pam Belluck, Test Is Improved Predictor of Fetal Disorders, N.Y.
TIMES WELL BLOG, https://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/26/new-dna-testbetter-at-predicting-some-disorders-in-babies-study-finds/ (last updated Feb. 27,
2014) (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (“Nine out of 10 women who are currently being
referred for further testing would not need invasive tests.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
94. See Joris Robert Vermeesch et al., Prenatal and Pre-implantation
Genetic Diagnosis, 17 NATURE REVS.: GENETICS 643, 646 (2016) (discussing how
NIPT results “yield valuable information on both fetal and maternal
health . . . [which] substantially improve overall pregnancy management”). For
example, several studies indicate NIPT may also accurately screen for other fetal
aneuploidies (e.g., trisomies 7, 15, and 16), and occult malignancy and
presymptomatic cancer in pregnant women. See Frédéric Amant et al.,
Presymptomatic Identification of Cancers in Pregnant Women During
Noninvasive Prenatal Testing, 1 JAMA ONCOLOGY 814, 814 (2015) (showing that
NIPT may also enable screening for presymptomatic maternal tumors—e.g.,
ovarian carcinoma, follicular lymphoma, and Hodgkin lymphoma); Baran
Bayindir et al., Noninvasive Prenatal Testing Using a Novel Analysis Pipeline to
Screen for All Autosomal Fetal Aneuploidies Improves Pregnancy Management,
23 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 1286, 1291 (2015) (demonstrating NIPT identification
for trisomies other than 13, 18, and 21); Diana W. Bianchi et al., Noninvasive
Prenatal Testing and Incidental Detection of Occult Maternal Malignancies, 314
JAMA 162, 168 (2015) (demonstrating NIPT detection of asymptomatic occult
malignancy in 3 out of 8 pregnant women).
95. See GARETH M. THOMAS, NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS,
DECISION-MAKING BY EXPECTANT PARENTS: NIPT, NIPD, AND CURRENT METHODS
OF PRENATAL SCREENING FOR DOWN’S SYNDROME (EVIDENCE REVIEW) (2016),
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/98686/1/Gareth-Thomas-evidence-review-decision-makingNIPT.pdf (collecting studies reporting women’s positive experiences of NIPT);
Celine Lewis et al., Women’s Experiences and Preferences for Service Delivery of
Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing for Aneuploidy in a Public Health Setting: A Mixed
Methods Study, 11 PLOS ONE 1, 8 (2016) (finding that pregnant interviewees were
“overwhelmingly positive” about NIPT); Ellika Sahlin et al., Positive Attitudes
towards Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing (NIPT) in a Swedish Cohort of 1,003
Pregnant Women, 11 PLOS ONE 1, 10 (2016) (concluding that the “overwhelming
majority” of interviewees viewed NIPT positively).
96. See Blake Murdoch et al., Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing and the
Unveiling of an Impaired Translation Process, 39 J. OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY
CAN. 10, 12–14 (2017) (citing evidence that commercial pressure and perceived
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unsurprising that PPs broadly favor incorporating NIPT into
standard patient care. After all, when confronted with a 22-gauge
needle or transvaginal probe, it is not difficult to believe that many
women would opt instead for a quick blood draw.
Notwithstanding its realized and potential benefits, however,
NIPT has considerable limitations. It does not, for instance, screen
for neural tube defects;97 early onset preeclampsia;98 or structural
abnormalities including physical defects of the heart, abdominal
wall, and skeleton.99 NIPT cannot detect the vast majority of
chromosomal abnormalities or most inherited diseases, and its
results are less reliable in cases of fetal and placental mosaicism,100
twin pregnancies,101 and maternal obesity.102 Essentially, NIPT is
“a very good screening test for what it’s designed to screen
risk of legal liability can drive uptake, influence public and professional opinion,
and bias research outcomes).
97. See Jean Gekas et al., Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing for Fetal
Chromosome Abnormalities: Review of Clinical and Ethical Issues, 9 APPLICATION
CLINICAL GENETICS 15, 19 (2016) (discussing the limitations of NIPT screening).
98. See Wybo Dondorp et al., Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing for Aneuploidy
and Beyond: Challenges of Responsible Innovation in Prenatal Screening, 23 EUR.
J. HUM. GENETICS 1438, 1442 (2015) (comparing NIPT and combined first
trimester screening and noting that only the latter tests for pregnancy
complication risks, e.g., pre-eclampsia or intra-uterine growth retardation).
99. See A. Theresa Wittman et al., Patient Perception of Negative
Noninvasive Prenatal Testing Results, 6 AM. J. PERINATOLOGY REPS. e391, e395
(2016) (discussing the nuances in patient comprehension regarding NIPT’s
inability to screen for nonstructural and structural abnormalities).
100. See Peter Benn, Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing Using Cell Free DNA in
Maternal Plasma: Recent Developments and Future Prospects, 3 J. CLINICAL MED.
537, 550 (2014) (“Discordancy due to undetected mosaicism can be expected to
arise regardless of which NIPT methodology is used.”).
101. See id. at 548 (noting that while NIPT’s performance is unaffected in
cases of monozygotic twins, “[f]or dizygotic twins and higher multiples NIPT is
more problematic”). But see Tze Kin Lau et al., Non-Invasive Prenatal Screening
of Fetal Down Syndrome by Maternal Plasma DNA Sequencing in Twin
Pregnancies, 26 J. MATERNAL-FETAL & NEONATAL MED. 434, 436 (2013) (arguing
that NIPT detection of fetal aneuploidy from maternal plasma is “theoretically
feasible” in twin pregnancies but acknowledging that “direct proof is lacking”).
102. See Mary C. Livergood et al., Obesity and Cell-Free DNA “No Calls”: Is
There an Optimal Gestational Age at Time of Sampling?, 216 AM. J. OBSTETRICS
& GYNECOLOGY 413.e1, 413.e3 (2017) (confirming a lower NIPT detection rate of
abnormalities among overweight and obese women as compared to normal-weight
women).
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for”—but it is designed to screen for a small number of medically
severe conditions.103 NIPT thus represents only an incremental
shift in the practice of prenatal genetic testing. NIPT’s recent and
arguably premature clinical uptake has only intensified consumer
demand for more expansive genetic forecasting.104 NIPT is meant
to supplement rather than replace traditional screening, at least
in its current iteration.105 But NIPT’s demonstrated commercial
viability has had a galvanizing effect on fetal genomic research.
Less than a year after NIPT’s debut, researchers began developing
true replacements for amniocentesis and CVS.106 Since 2011,
several independent studies have successfully demonstrated
proof-of-principle that it is possible to use NIPT to non-invasively
sequence the whole prenatal genome.107
103. Belluck, supra note 93 (quoting Dr. Van den Veyver, who also voices
concern “that if women stop [at NIPT], they miss the opportunity to have a
diagnostic test like amnio that can detect other chromosomal abnormalities”).
104. See Megan Allyse & Christopher Thomas Scott, Too Much of a Good
Thing, in Allison, supra note 8, at 598 (“[A] commercial model that encourages
widespread distribution of such tests as NIPTs may emphasize clinical uptake
over clinical utility.”); Minear et al., supra note 84, at 375 (commenting that the
“pace of clinical translation has made it difficult for provider education to keep
up,” and describing the problem of conveying reliable and accurate information to
PPs as “virtually impossible”); Murdoch et al., supra note 96, at 14 (concluding
that NIPT commercialization has polluted public and professional perception
such that “fast adoption” has occurred without appropriate evidence of
cost-efficacy and clinical utility). Contra Benn, supra note 100, at 551 (arguing
that the lower positive predictive value of NIPT does not justify withholding it
from women with low prior risk); Ken Song et al., Clinical Utility and Cost of
Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing with cfDNA Analysis in High-Risk Women Based
on a US Population, 26 J. MATERNAL-FETAL & NEONATAL MED. 1180, 1183–84
(2013) (finding NIPT superior in terms of accuracy and cost-effectiveness over
first-trimester combined screening and integrated screening).
105. See Allison, supra note 8, at 596–97 (explaining that NIPTs are typically
only offered to pregnant women with a “high risk of carrying a fetus with a defect,”
whereas women with low risk of carrying a defective fetus receive traditional
invasive screening tests).
106. See H. Christina Fan et al., Non-Invasive Prenatal Measurement of the
Fetal Genome, 487 NATURE 320, 320 (2012) (demonstrating that the prenatal
genome can be determined non-invasively).
107. See id. (describing how a molecular counting method can be clinically
applied to prenatal genome determination); Jacob O. Kitzman et al., Non-Invasive
Whole Genome Sequencing of a Human Fetus, 137 SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED.
137ra76, 137ra81 (2012) (demonstrating non-invasive prediction of the
whole-genome sequence of a human fetus); Y.M. Dennis Lo et al., Maternal
Plasma DNA Sequencing Reveals the Genome-Wide Genetic and Mutational
Profile of the Fetus, 2 SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED. 61, 91 (2010) (constructing a
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B. . . . And Whole-Genome Sequencing . . .

The first generations of genetic sequencing technology focused
only on pre-identified “variants of interest.” Genotyping, for
example, returns small data sets on specific bases in the genome
associated with recognized diseases.108 This type of single-gene
testing is highly effective for confirming expressed symptoms, or
for identifying suspected mutations early.109 Imagine you are
trying to remember the exact phrasing of Pride and Prejudice’s
infamous first sentence. Genotyping is like a card catalog—it is an
effective tool for finding the sentence in the library, but only if you
already know Pride and Prejudice is the book you are looking for.
In medicine, card catalogs can be incredibly valuable. If a young
male patient begins exhibiting symptoms like delay of motor
milestones, muscle wasting, and abnormal levels of dystrophin in
the blood, a genetic test targeting the DMD gene can help establish
a diagnosis of Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD).110 Similarly,
if PPs have a family history of DMD, genetic testing can determine
if an individual is a carrier and, if so, the risk of passing on the
genetic mutation.111 Importantly, in both cases, the physician must
know that Duchenne causes symptoms like the patient’s and that
the disease is associated with a DMD gene mutation.112 That is, in

genome-wide genetic map of a fetus from maternal plasma DNA sequences and
from information about the paternal genotype and maternal haplotype).
108. See Mark Wanner, Genomes Versus Exomes Versus Genotypes, JACKSON
LABORATORY (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.jax.org/news-and-insights/jaxblog/2016/september/genomes-versus-exomes-versus-genotypes (last visited Apr.
16, 2019) (providing an overview of genotyping) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
109. See id. (“[G]enotyping focuses on specific bases in the genome known to
vary from person to person.”).
110. See Learning About Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy, NAT. HUM. GENOME
RES.
INST.,
https://www.genome.gov/19518854/learning-about-duchennemuscular-dystrophy/#3 (last updated Apr. 18, 2013) (last visited Apr. 16, 2019)
(describing the symptoms of DMD) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
111. See id. (discussing how DMD is inherited).
112. See Wanner, supra note 108 (explaining that genotyping focuses on
“certain locations in the genome where variations often occur”).
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order to conduct effective genotyping, the physician must know in
advance that the DMD gene is the target.
Next-generation sequencing (NGS), however, is rapidly
supplanting genotyping. If genotyping is the card catalog, NGS is
the Google search. With this technology, a physician need not know
in advance that the sentence is from Pride and Prejudice because
NGS allows him to check every “book” in the library
simultaneously.113 There are two distinct types of NGS.
Whole-exome sequencing (WES) focuses on the known
protein-coding regions of the genome (i.e., what we think of as
genes), rather than on specific variants of interest.114
Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) focuses on both the coding and
non-coding portions of the genome (i.e., all DNA).115 Though WES
expands the frame of analysis measurably, it is but a stop on the
way to WGS. WGS is the most comprehensive method of genetic
analysis, allowing investigation of an individual’s entire genome.116
However, comprehensiveness is not necessarily a good indicator of
clinical utility.117

113. See Olwen Reina, A Beginner’s Guide to Next Generation Sequencing
(NGS) Technology, BITE SIZE BIO, https://bitesizebio.com/21193/a-beginnersguide-to-next-generation-sequencing-ngs-technology/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2019)
(explaining that compared to genotyping, “NGS is characterized by improved
accuracy and speed, but also reduced manpower and cost”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
114. See What Are Whole Exome Sequencing and Whole Genome Sequencing?,
GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/testing/sequencing
(last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (describing how whole-exome sequencing works) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
115. See id. (describing how whole-genome sequencing works).
116. See id. (explaining that WGS can identify variations that WES would
miss). WGS is distinguishable from a genome-wide association study (GWAS).
GWAS involves rapid scans of an entire genome for variations associated with
disease. However, like genotyping, GWAS only surveys an individual’s genome
for strategically selected markers of variation (i.e., single nucleotide
polymorphisms (SNP)). See Genome-Wide Association Studies, NAT. HUM.
GENOME RES. INST., https://www.genome.gov/20019523/genomewide-associationstudies-fact-sheet/ (last updated Aug. 27, 2015) (last visited Apr. 16, 2019)
(providing an overview of GWAS) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
117. See What Are Whole Exome Sequencing and Whole Genome Sequencing,
supra note 114 (explaining that although “many more genetic changes can be
identified with whole-exome and whole-genome sequencing than with select gene
sequencing, the significance of much of this information is unknown”).
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Despite its comparatively narrow lens, WES is currently
considered more clinically valuable than WGS.118 The reasons are
both philosophic and economic.119 In providing a base-by-base view
of the genome, WGS generates data of unparalleled breadth,
depth, and volume.120 WGS thus differs in quantity and in kind
from other types of genetic testing.121 On the one hand, it offers
higher-yield returns by virtue of the simple fact that it returns
more (and does so efficiently).122
More information has the potential to expose disease-causing
variants that would otherwise be missed and to therefore
positively affect diagnosis rates.123 On the other hand, WGS
returns indiscriminately. In addition to information about
medically-severe, early-onset conditions (i.e., the same information
available via genotyping and WES), WGS also generates vast
amounts of information that may be clinically irrelevant,
diagnostically ambiguous, or nonmedical.124 Perhaps most
118. See Janine Meienberg et al., Clinical Sequencing: Is WGS the Better
WES?, 135 HUM. GENETICS 359, 359 (2016) (“Current clinical next-generation
sequencing is done by using gene panels and exome analysis . . . .”); Wanner, supra
note 108 (stating that “[m]any of the institutions to first offer clinical sequencing
chose to focus on the coding regions only—the exome”).
119. See Meienberg et al., supra note 118, at 359 (discussing how WES “have
been favored because of low sequencing costs, short turnaround time, and low rate
of unspecific or incidental findings”).
120. See id. (explaining that WGS is “more likely than WES to provide
complete coverage of the entire coding region of the genome”).
121. See Wanner, supra note 108 (explaining that whereas WES only
sequences 1.5% of the human genome and does not sequence non-coding regions,
WGS sequences the entire human genome including the non-coding regions).
122. See id. (discussing how WES only diagnoses roughly 30% of patients and
WGS may improve diagnostic rates).
123. See Jamie M. Ellingford et al., Whole Genome Sequencing Increases
Molecular Diagnostic Yield Compared with Current Diagnostic Testing for
Inherited Retinal Disease, 123 OPTHALMOLOGY 1143, 1146 (2016) (finding that
WGS could result in a 29% diagnostic increase for inherited retinal disease);
Dimitri J. Stavropoulos et al., Whole-Genome Sequencing Expands Diagnostic
Utility and Improves Clinical Management in Paediatric Medicine, 15012 NPJ
GENOMIC MED. 1, 5 (2016) (finding that “WGS exceeds other technology platforms
in ability to detect genetic variants involved in childhood disease”).
124. There are five categories of novel information implicated by WGS:
“variants of unknown significance, nonmedical genetic markers, carrier status,
susceptibility genes, and genes expressing conditions with late onset.” Greer
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concerning, WGS provides unparalleled access to “variants of
unknown significance” (VUS), the scientific term for nebulous
genetic findings.125 Given the volume of results and levels of
uncertainty attendant to them, many clinicians consider WGS an
inelegant alternative to WES.126
Indeed, in terms of philosophy, many clinicians subscribe to a
theory of elegant medicine. Edmund Pellegrino articulated the
theory as one of temperance, wherein clinicians “use only as many
tests and treatments as necessary—just so much as to be able to
understand what could be wrong, what could be done, and what
ought to be done for the patient.”127 Pellegrino championed doing
more with less, an ideal he styled variously as “diagnostic
elegance” and “therapeutic parsimony.”128 For the elegant
clinician, “reflex[ive] shotgunning in the face of uncertainty”129 is

Donley et al., Prenatal Whole Genome Sequencing: Just Because We Can, Should
We?, 42 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 28, 29 (2012).
125. See id. at 31 (“Because the health-related impact of VUS cannot be stated
with any degree of certainty, the variants do not yet reveal any medically
important information.”).
126. See Richard R. Sharp, Downsizing Genomic Medicine: Approaching the
Ethical Complexity of Whole-Genome Sequencing by Starting Small, 13 GENETICS
MED. 191, 191 (2011) (cautioning against clinical integration of WGS “before
having established the knowledge base and clinical infrastructure required to
support [it]”). But not all clinicians consider WGS less viable than the
alternatives. For example, Howard Jacob, former Director of the Human and
Molecular Genetics Center at the Medical College of Wisconsin, argues that “one
simple test [referring to WGS] is a lot easier to figure out than doing each
individual test.” Ryan Cross, Howard Jacob on Why Whole Genome Sequencing Is
Best for Medicine, BIO-IT WORLD (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.bioitworld.com/2016/4/13/howard-jacob-why-whole-genome-sequencing-best-formedicine.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). That said, Jacob acknowledges that he and his research team are
considered “cowboys and irresponsible for using a research-only tool” by the
medical establishment. Id.
127. Daniel P. Sulmasy, Edmund Pellegrino’s Philosophy and Ethics of
Medicine: An Overview, 24 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 105, 109–10 (2014).
128. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medical
Gatekeeping, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 23, 27 (1986) (describing
therapeutic parsimony and diagnostic elegance as ethical guidelines for the
practice of competent medicine).
129. Howard Brody, Cost Containment as Professional Challenge, 8
THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 5, 11 (1987) (discussing Pellegrino’s fundamental
requirements for practicing ethical medicine).
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intellectually sloppy.130 So-called shotgun medicine131 thus stands
as the inverse of elegant medicine, with its “test everybody for
everything”132 approach representative of everything wrong in
modern medicine.133 At least until scientific understanding catches
up with technological capability, WGS is something akin to the
genetic testing equivalent of “everything but the kitchen sink.”
In terms of economy, most of our scientific understanding is
currently limited to Mendelian (single-gene) disorders.134 Though
the exome only comprises between 1–2% of the human genome,
approximately 85% of the nearly 4,000 Mendelian disorders with a
known molecular basis are caused by gene mutations located in the
exome.135 That said, more than 90% of the human exome, and 98%
130. See Joseph S. Alpert, Required Reading for Anyone Involved in Graduate
Medical Education, 128 AM. J. MEDICINE 441, 441 (2015) (calling an “approach of
obtaining every test possible, needed or not, the results of which would be sifted
through later . . . too expensive, too wasteful, too invasive, and too intellectually
sloppy”).
131. Pellegrino himself was more diplomatic in his assessments of shotgun
medicine. He described it as but one of many styles of practice, and used the more
flattering term “diagnostic enthusiasm, which leaves no test unused.” EDMUND D.
PELLEGRINO, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MEDICINE REBORN: A PELLEGRINO READER 34 (H.
Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. & Fabrice Jotterand eds., 2008).
132. Dan Shine, Rules for Shotgun Diagnosis, 128 AM. J. MED. e59, e59 (2015).
133. For a thoughtful and thorough consideration of the development of
modern treatment models, see generally KENNETH M. LUDMERER, LET ME HEAL:
THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESERVE EXCELLENCE IN AMERICAN MEDICINE 240–63 (2014)
(discussing the evolution from the education-centered medical system of the
pre-1980s to the economics-centered medical system of the current era and
concluding that “the system [is] not designed to let [doctors] heal patients who
require[] ‘slow medicine’”).
134. See What Are the Different Ways in Which a Genetic Condition Can Be
Inherited?,
GENETICS
HOME
REFERENCE,
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/inheritance/inheritancepatterns (last visited Apr.
16, 2019) (demonstrating a greater understanding of single-gene disorders
compared to polygenic disorders) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
135. See Murim Choi et al., Genetic Diagnosis by Whole Exome Capture and
Massively Parallel DNA Sequencing, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 19,096,
19,096 (2009) (describing the role that genetic mutations play in Mendelian
disorders); Jessica X. Chong et al., The Genetic Basis of Mendelian Phenotypes:
Discoveries, Challenges, and Opportunities, 97 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 199, 199
(2015) (explaining that “2,937 genes underlying 4,163 Mendelian phenotypes
have been discovered”).
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of the genome, remain a question mark136—we do not know what
most genetic findings from these regions mean, or whether they
mean anything at all.137 Practically, this means that even when
researchers limit the area of inquiry to the exome, upwards of 40%
of patients with suspected Mendelian disorders are left with the
diagnosis: We don’t know.138 Considering, then, the billions of ways
that a genetic mutation might occur, it makes sense to focus on
common “troublemaker genes.”139 Or at least it did when
sequencing was costly. Until recently, sequencing a whole human
genome was prohibitively expensive. In 2003, it cost $2.7 billion.140
136. See Donley et al., supra note 124, at 30 (explaining that “it will likely
take decades to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the genome” (citing
Amy L. McGuire & James R. Lupski, Personal Genome Research: What Should
the Participant Be Told?, 26 TRENDS GENETICS 199, 200 (2010))).
137. For a long time, it was assumed that the genome’s non-coding regions
lacked functionality. Francis Crick famously speculated that non-coding genes
were “little better than junk.” Stephen S. Hall, Hidden Treasures in Junk DNA,
SCI. AM. (Oct. 1, 2012), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/hiddentreasures-in-junk-dna/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review). In 2012, Nature published a series of papers based on data
gathered by the ENCODE project debunking the idea of “junk DNA.” For a
fascinating discussion on the evolution of thought regarding junk DNA, and the
scholarly debate the ENCODE project generated, see W. Ford Doolittle, Is Junk
DNA Bunk? A Critique of ENCODE, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 5294, 5294
(2013) (recapping the debate ENCODE’s publications prompted and arguing that
notwithstanding ENCORE’s findings, “junk” remains an apt descriptor “for much
of our genome”). See also ENCODE Project Consortium, An Integrated
Encyclopedia of DNA Elements in the Human Genome, 489 NATURE 57, 57 (2012)
(assigning “biochemical functions for 80% of the genome”).
138. See Damian Smedley et al., A Whole-Genome Analysis Framework for
Effective Identification of Pathogenic Regulatory Variants in Mendelian Disease,
99 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 595, 604 (2016) (estimating that when WES is used,
“only about 25–40% of individuals with suspected Mendelian disease . . . actually
receive a diagnosis”); Wanner, supra note 108 (estimating that “exome sequencing
still leaves ~70% of patients without diagnoses”).
139. Whereas whole-genome sequencing identifies previously unknown
genes, traditional tests would only focus on the known “troublemaker genes” such
as trisomies 13, 18, and 21. See Whole Genome Sequencing, GENETICS
GENERATION, http://knowgenetics.org/whole-genome-sequencing/ (last visited
Apr. 16, 2019) (discussing the advantages of WGS) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
140. See The Cost of Sequencing a Human Genome, NAT. HUM. GENOME. RES.
INST.,
https://www.genome.gov/27565109/the-cost-of-sequencing-a-humangenome/ (last updated July 6, 2016) (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (detailing the price
to develop the first human genome sequence) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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Since then, WGS’s price tag has plummeted to under $1,000141—a
marked decrease that nonetheless remains above the costs of
genotyping and WES.
C. . . . To Prenatal Whole-Genome Sequencing
NIPT and WGS are still transitioning into clinical care.
Though there are those with philosophical reservations, cost is still
a factor. For NIPT, cost-effective analyses weigh in favor of clinical
adoption.142 There is also growing professional and consumer
support for NIPT’s implementation as a routine first-tier screening
method.143 For WGS, costs have fallen more than 99% in less than
fifteen years.144 What once took thirteen years and billions of
dollars now takes roughly three weeks.145 In January 2017,
Illumina, the largest manufacturer of DNA sequencers, issued a
press release promising that its latest product would “enable the
$100 genome.”146 In subsequent interviews, Illumina’s CEO was
more pragmatic. He admitted that the $100 genome was “more of
a roadmap– something that would probably happen in more than
three years and fewer than ten.”147 Either way, there is no denying
that sequencing costs are plummeting.
141. See id. (listing the price for WGS in 2016).
142. See Song et al., supra note 104, at 1180 (“NIPT, at a base case price of
$795, was more clinically effective and less costly (dominant) over both FTS [first
trimester screening] and INT [integrated screening].”).
143. See Global NIPT Market to Exceed USD 2.5 Bn by 2025 Led by US,
(July
3,
2018,
6:45
AM),
China,
REUTERS
https://www.reuters.com/brandfeatures/venture-capital/article?id=41031
(last
visited Apr. 16, 2019) (discussing NIPT market growth) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
144. See The Cost of Sequencing a Human Genome, supra note 140
(demonstrating the reduced cost to produce WGS).
145. See id. (discussing the logistics of producing WGS).
146. Illumina Introduces the NovaSeq Series—A New Architecture Designed
to
Usher
in
the
$100
Genome,
ILLUMINA
(Jan.
9,
2017),
https://www.illumina.com/company/news-center/press-releases/press-releasedetails.html?newsid=2236383 (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
147. Matthew Herper, Illumina Promises to Sequence Human Genome for
$100—But Not Quite Yet, FORBES (Jan. 9, 2017, 5:30 PM),
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Recent opinion pieces have described WGS as a challenge to
long-considered “basic tenets of genetics,” such that “we are all
mutants” now.148 Tom Shakespeare rather articulately observed
that “whole genome sequencing reminds us that everyone is
carrying deleterious mutations” and that “[i]n the postgenomic era,
everyone is potentially disabled.”149 In a 2010 Lancet piece, Kelly
Ormond et al. predicted that “an average person might need
information about roughly 100 genetic risks discovered in their
genome.”150 And as noted previously, there is a shortage of genetic
counselors to provide that information.151 Of course, the difficult
questions raised by genetic testing in general, and by WGS in
particular, apply no less in the prenatal context. If we are all
mutants now, what does that mean for our unborn children—and
what, if anything, should we do with this information?
The influx of genetic data, the inherent complexity and
uncertainty associated with that data, and the difficulties in
obtaining truly informed consent has created a perfect storm.
Given the level of debate in academic and professional quarters, it
is unsurprising that the storm has caught the attention of our
political representatives. ABGA legislation is the clear result of
that attention. The constitutionality of ABGAs has already been
raised in the broader abortion debate and indeed, the Fourteenth
Amendment is an obvious and appropriate lens through which to
examine reason-based abortion bans. Scholars have done so at
length.152 However, in the schema of our constitutional framework,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2017/01/09/illumina-promises-tosequence-human-genome-for-100-but-not-quite-yet/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2019)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
148. Carrie Arnold, ‘We Are All Mutants Now’: The Trouble with Genetic
GUARDIAN
(July
18,
2017,
1:00
PM),
Testing,
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2017/jul/18/we-are-all-mutants-now-thetrouble-with-genetic-testing (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
149. Tom Shakespeare, A Brave New World of Bespoke Babies?, 17 AM. J.
BIOETHICS 19, 19 (2017).
150. Kelly E. Ormond et al., Challenges in the Clinical Application of
Whole-Genome Sequencing, 375 LANCET 1749, 1750 (2010).
151. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
152. See Donley, supra note 68, at 291 (examining the constitutionality of
reason-based abortion bans in the WGS context at both the state and federal
levels, under the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and
Section 5 of the 14th Amendment); Jaime S. King, Not This Child: Constitutional
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the First Amendment is no less important than the Fourteenth
and, in the context of laws like North Dakota’s, no less relevant.
III. The Development of Free Speech
Free speech protection is traditionally justified on intrinsic
and instrumental grounds.
That is, speech is adjudged either inherently valuable as a
conduit for self-expression,153 or extrinsically valuable as a tool to
Questions in Regulating Non-Invasive Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis and Selective
Abortion, 60 UCLA L. REV. 2, 2 (2012) (exploring 14th Amendment challenges to
prenatal genetic testing technologies and reason-based abortion bans); Rachel
Rebouché & Karen Rothenberg, Mixed Messages: The Intersection of Prenatal
Genetic Testing and Abortion, 55 HOW. L.J. 983, 986 (2012) (arguing that “current
law and practice put genetic testing and abortion on a collision course”); John A.
Robertson, Abortion and Technology: Sonograms, Fetal Pain, Viability, and Early
Prenatal Diagnosis, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 327, 373–79 (2011) (speculating about
the likely reaction of anti-abortion groups to prenatal sequencing and considering
whether states can constitutionally restrict abortion or limit testing); Samantha
von Ende, Note, SEQUELA: Casey, Gonzales, and State Legislatures’
Unscrupulous Use of Science in Crafting Legislation to Regulate Pregnant Women
and Women’s Access to Reproductive Health Care, 4 IND. J.L. & SOC. EQUALITY 21,
49 (2016) (focusing on states’ “unscrupulous use” of advancements in reproductive
technologies to restrict abortion rights).
153. Seana Valentine Shiffrin argues against conceptualizing free speech as
instrumentally valuable. Rather, “[s]peech, and free speech in particular,
are . . . the only precise avenues by which one can be known as the individual one
is by others.” Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of
Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 283, 291 (2011). For Shiffrin, free speech facilitates
the transmission of one’s thoughts and beliefs to others—a critical function “[i]f
what makes one a distinctive individual qua person is largely a matter of the
contents of one’s mind . . . .” Id. Shiffrin’s argument assumes that “[b]eing known
by others . . . is important in itself.” Id. at 292. Edwin Baker’s liberty theory of
the First Amendment also emphasizes inherent value, albeit on different grounds
than Shiffrin’s thinker-based approach. See Elizabeth Blanks Hindman, First
Amendment Theories and Press Responsibility: The Work of Zechariah Chafee,
Thomas Emerson, Vincent Blasi and Edwin Baker, 69 JOURNALISM Q. 48, 59 (1992)
(describing Baker’s theory as protective of “the speaker in the act of speaking,”
“whether or not intended to communicate propositions or attitudes to others”).
See also C. Edwin Baker, The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the First
Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 293, 298 (1982) (noting that instrumental theories
suggest First Amendment protection would extend to “effective speech” but not to
communicative or symbolic speech); Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 153 (1989) (discussing justification for free speech on
dignity and equality grounds in that “suppression represents a kind of contempt
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accomplish something else (though there is disagreement about
what that something else may be).154 Whatever the theoretical
underpinnings of these value assessments, however, it is clear that
not all speech is valuable. Speech that incites unlawful or violent
conduct, for example, receives very minimal protection under the
First Amendment.155 The same is true for libel,156 child

for citizens that is objectionable independent of its consequences”); Martin H.
Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 595 (1982) (arguing
against determining constitutional protection on the basis of types of speech
because “all forms of expression are equally valuable for constitutional
purposes”); Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a Metatheory of Free Speech, 10 SW. U.L.
REV. 237, 241 (1978) (arguing for the analytic strength of intrinsic over
instrumental claims because though controversial, “only forthright claims of
intrinsic value . . . can avoid the endless chase of means after ends”).
154. See, e.g., Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) (suggesting
that the First Amendment’s “urgent” value lies in ensuring appropriate political
campaign conduct); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)
(recognizing free speech as necessary to prevent “occasional tyrannies” and
promote self-governance); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (establishing the canonical “marketplace of ideas”
metaphor wherein free speech is instrumentally valuable as a catalyst for the
discovery of truth); ALEXANDER MEIKLE JOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF GOVERNMENT 29 (3d ed. 2004) (proposing free speech protection as
instrumentally directed at preserving “the program of self-government”); Vincent
Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND RES.
J. 521, 527–28 (1977) (articulating an instrumental value for free speech in
checking the abuse of power by public officials and calling it “the checking value”).
155. This type of speech is also called “Brandenburg incitement” in reference
to the landmark case of the same name. See generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969). The Brandenburg test represents the strongest free speech
protection ever recognized by the Court and the current governing law in First
Amendment jurisprudence.
156. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (calling libel
“of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the societal interest in order and morality”).
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pornography,157 obscenity,158 “fighting words,”159 and true
threats.160 It is also clear that not all valuable speech is equally
valuable. For instance, commercial speech is considered less
valuable than core speech and therefore enjoys limited First
Amendment protection.161 By contrast, political speech and press
publications, the paradigmatic examples of high-value core speech,
receive the fullest constitutional protection.162 The question of
value thus has more than just descriptive significance; value
assignments prescribe levels of constitutional scrutiny.
157. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982) (recognizing and
classifying child pornography as a category outside the protection of the First
Amendment).
158. The Supreme Court has consistently held that obscenity— i.e., hardcore
sexual materials (distinguishable from the broader category of pornography)— is
not protected, except with respect to private possession in the home. See Paris
Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973) (concluding that legislatures may
ban commercialized obscenity based on its “tendency to exert a corrupting and
debasing impact leading to antisocial behavior”); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
565 (1969) (“If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has
no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read
or films he may watch.”).
159. Chaplinsky defined fighting words as “those by which their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572; see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971)
(adopting a “directed use” requirement for distinguishing fighting words from
merely offensive speech).
160. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (“‘True threats’ [are] those
statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an
intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of
individuals.”).
161. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976) (concluding that commercial speech is not valueless but
is different enough from other forms of speech such that “a different [i.e., lesser]
degree of protection is necessary”).
162. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (acknowledging the
“Constitution’s special concern with threats to the right of citizens to participate
in political affairs”); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982)
(placing political speech “on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment
values” (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980))); N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 296 (1964) (explaining that the First Amendment “at the
very least . . . leaves the people and the press free to criticize officials and discuss
public affairs with impunity”); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)
(describing the phrasing of the First Amendment as designed “to assure
unfettered interchange” of political and social ideas).
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A. Legitimate, Important, and Compelling: The Levels of Judicial
Scrutiny
In the earliest part of the twentieth century, judicial review
came in just two flavors: rational basis and strict scrutiny. Both
were, and are, generally understood to be outcome-determinative.
Low-value speech triggers rational basis review. Built on a bedrock
of judicial minimalism, rational basis analyses begin with a strong
presumption of constitutional validity.163 When confronted with a
categorical prohibition on obscenity164 or child pornography,165 for
instance, the Supreme Court asks only: Is the restriction rationally
related to a legitimate state interest?166 By the Court’s own
articulation, rational basis sets a low bar. It accepts as valid “any
conceivable basis” for a claimed state interest, even if offered post
hoc;167 even if “not . . . in every respect logically consistent”;168 even
if “unwise [or] improvident”;169 even if imperfect in operation.170 At
163. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A
Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1775
(2004) (calling rational basis review so “stunningly minimal” that it allows
“regulatory schemes based on highly dubious justification”); Cass R. Sunstein,
Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 78 (1996) (stating that
“‘rational basis’ review is rooted in a presumption of good faith, rebutted only in
rare instances”).
164. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60–63 (1973)
(upholding state regulation of adult films in public theaters even lacking
“conclusive proof”); Schauer, supra note 163, at 1775 (noting that the Supreme
Court has failed to subject obscenity regulations “to anything more than rational
basis review”).
165. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 753, 758 (1982) (applying
rational basis review and finding that a State has “somewhat more freedom in
proscribing works which portray sexual or lewd exhibitions of genitalia by
children”).
166. See Thomas B. Nachbar, The Rationality of Rational Basis Review, 102
VA. L. REV. 1627, 1627 (“Through the ‘rational basis’ test, the Supreme Court
asserts the authority to assess whether laws are ‘rationally related to a legitimate
government interest.’”).
167. See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. 307, 315 (noting also that “it is
entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for
the challenged [law] actually motivated the legislature”). See also Russell W.
Galloway, Basic Free Speech Analysis, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 883, 898–99 (1991)
(describing rationality review as requiring only “any conceivable valid
government interest”).
168. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955).
169. Id. at 488.
170. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 541–42 (1961) (eschewing the
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the other end of the spectrum, high-value core speech triggers
strict scrutiny.
Strict scrutiny swaps “rationally related” for “narrowly
tailored” and “legitimate” for “compelling.”171 The question thus
becomes: Is the restriction narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest?172 Where rational basis review assumes
legislative good faith, strict scrutiny analyses begin with strong
skepticism. In terms of a speech restriction’s chance of surviving a
legal objection, strict scrutiny is the legal equivalent of sinking a
basket from half-court.173
Beginning in the 1940s, hairline fractures began appearing in
the glossy veneer of the two-tiered system of judicial review. Some
cases seemed to call for “more exacting judicial scrutiny” than
rational basis allows.174 In those cases, the Supreme Court was at
the same time hesitant to treat the claimed state interest as a
foregone issue. For example, in Kovacs v. Cooper,175 the city of
Trenton, New Jersey banned the use of sound trucks (i.e., motor
idea that a legislature be required to “hew the line of logical exactness” under the
rational basis standard).
171. For examples of strict scrutiny applications, see United States v.
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 482 (2010) (striking down a statute banning depictions of
animal cruelty for insufficient narrow tailoring); United States v. Playboy Entm’t
Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (failing to find a compelling government interest
and narrow tailoring for content-based regulations under the 1996
Telecommunications Act); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200,
235– 37 (1995) (articulating and applying the strict scrutiny test to racial
classifications).
172. See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 96 n.14 (2010) (“Strict
scrutiny asks whether the law is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest.” (quoting Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. at 813)).
173. In 1972, Stanford Law professor Gerald Gunther described strict
scrutiny under the Warren Court as “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.” Gerard
Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 48 (1972). The phrase has since
become a “pithy and influential slogan” for a predetermined result. Matthew D.
Bunker et al., Strict in Theory, But Feeble in Fact? First Amendment Strict
Scrutiny and the Protection of Speech, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 349, 349 (2011). In
core speech cases, strict scrutiny means “the speaker [will] triumph, and the
government’s case (and frequently the statute on which it [is] based) [will] go
down in flames.” Id. at 351.
174. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
175. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
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vehicles affixed with a loudspeaker) on public streets.176 The
appellant was arrested by a city patrolman for parking his truck
near a municipal building and using a sound truck to broadcast
political commentary about an ongoing Trenton labor dispute.177
The appellant’s commentary, decidedly not low-value speech,
should have triggered strict scrutiny. And of course, challenged
laws should not survive strict scrutiny. The analysis should have
been straightforward, the outcome predetermined.178 And yet, even
if Trenton could not demonstrate an interest which would
traditionally qualify as compelling— e.g., public health and safety,
national security, and the like179—the Court nonetheless felt that
the city’s interest in protecting residents “from the distracting
noises of vehicles equipped with such sound amplifying devices”
was important.180 To hold otherwise would violate “the quiet and
tranquility so desirable for city dwellers.”181 Indeed, it would put
them “at the mercy of advocates of particular religious, social or
political persuasions.”182 The Court was unwilling to profoundly

176. See id. at 78 (prohibiting “any device known as a sound truck, loud
speaker, or amplifiers . . . which emits therefrom loud and raucous
noises . . . upon any vehicle operated or standing upon said streets or public
places aforementioned”).
177. Id. at 79 (recounting the record of the police officer’s testimony whereby
the Trenton officer heard the appellant broadcasting his voice in what the lower
court believed was a commentary on the labor dispute progress).
178. See supra Bunker, note 173 at 349 (describing strict scrutiny as a “pithy
and influential slogan” for a predetermined result).
179. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927) (expanding
Gitlow’s list of compelling interest to include preventing “endanger[ment] of the
foundations of organized government”); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 667
(1926) (finding that the interests in preventing corruption of public morals,
incitements to crime, and disturbances of the peace are sufficiently compelling to
justify speech restrictions); see also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38
(1905) (concluding that the state’s interest in protecting public health and public
safety is sufficiently compelling to justify compulsory vaccination). Though not a
speech case, Jacobson is relevant in that it emphasized that core constitutional
rights have never been without limitation. Under our system of government, a
citizen: “may be compelled, by force if need be, against his will and without regard
to his personal wishes or his pecuniary interests, or even his religious or political
convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country and risk the
chance of being shot down in its defense.” Id. at 29.
180. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949).
181. Id. at 87.
182. Id.
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handicap the government’s ability to secure the peace.183 Thus, in
Kovacs and thereafter, the Supreme Court adopted a new
methodology.184 By the late 1980s, that methodology had coalesced
under the banner of “intermediate scrutiny,” a nebulous grey area
that now occupies the middle of the spectrum between rational
basis and strict scrutiny.185
Today, speech that is neither low-value nor high-value
triggers intermediate scrutiny. Though it has multiple
formulations,186 intermediate scrutiny refers to a “middle-tier”
183. Cf. id. at 88 (“To enforce freedom of speech in disregard of the rights of
others would be harsh and arbitrary in itself.”).
184. In truth, the new methodology existed for several decades as a set of
disparate speech-specific tests. For a thorough discussion of each test, see
generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test that Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny
in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 785–800.
185. The development of intermediate scrutiny in First Amendment law has
garnered mixed reviews. According to some scholars, rational basis was “an
acceptable starting point,” but forcing a two-tiered system to accommodate the
nuances of the First Amendment “sacrifice[d] much-needed subtleties for
doctrinal simplicity.” Bhagwat, supra note 184, at 785–86. Accord Neel U.
Sukhatme, Making Sense of Hybrid Speech: A New Model for Commercial Speech
and Expressive Conduct, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2836, 2836 (2005) (noting that “not all
speech fits neatly within this dichotomy”). Bhagwat argues that even three tiers
is not enough. See id. at 831 (arguing for disaggregation as the doctrinal solution
to the problem of intermediate scrutiny). Other scholars argue that it is not the
two-tiered system that is deficient but rather the judicial tendency to circumvent
it. By this view, intermediate scrutiny is one of the ways in which “courts manage
to avoid the application of strict scrutiny.” Bunker et al., supra note 173, at 352.
186. The Supreme Court does not consistently use the same language in its
application of intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 798–99 (1989) (combining “narrowly tailored” with “legitimate interest”
to form intermediate hybrid analysis); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public.
Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (requiring a “substantial” government
interest and a means of advancing it that is “not more extensive than necessary”);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25–29 (1976) (describing the standard of review as
a “rigorous” weighing of the competing interests and applying something less
than strict scrutiny); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968)
(stating that “the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling;
substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong”—and settling on
“important or substantial”); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) (calling
for a “weigh[ing of] the circumstances” and an appraisal of “the substantiality of
the reasons advanced” by the government). The Supreme Court has itself
acknowledged inconsistency in this area. See Denver Area Ed. Telecomm.
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 741–42 (1996) (calling it “close scrutiny”
and declaring it “unwise and unnecessary definitively to pick one analogy or one
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approach that requires a “sharper focus” than “the relatively
deferential ‘rational basis’ standard.”187 The question is: Does the
speech restriction advance a “significant/substantial/important”
government interest via reasonable means?188 But unlike in
rational basis and strict scrutiny analyses, the Court’s asking of
the question under intermediate scrutiny is not perfunctory.
Whether the answer is “yes” or “no” is not predetermined. Rather,
“the track record of outcomes is mixed” and “[i]nstead of winning
always or never, the government may sometimes win or sometimes
lose—it all depends.”189 For the purposes of this Article, it is
perhaps enough to understand that intermediate scrutiny is a
vague balancing technique that applies to medium-value speech.
B. The Doctrinal Development of Professional Speech

specific set of words”).
187. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
Bhagwat and others have concluded that “despite somewhat differing
formulations, many of the Court’s new ‘tests’ share some basic, common
characteristics.” Bhagwat, supra note 184, at 801. See also Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Post-Liberal Judging: The Role of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L.
REV. 293, 297 (1992) (stating that all the many formulations of intermediate
scrutiny ultimately require laws to “meet the same mid-level hurdle”).
188. Bhagwat, supra note 184, at 801. Jay D. Wexler’s definition of
intermediate scrutiny is also clarifying: “a test that requires a state interest which
is greater than legitimate but less than compelling and a fit between means and
end that is not necessarily narrowly tailored but has more than just an incidental
connection.” Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as
Judicial Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298, 300 n.15 (1998).
189. Sullivan, supra note 187, at 297–98.
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The category of medium-value speech is expansive.
Expressive/symbolic conduct,190 mass media communications,191
and commercial speech192 all trigger intermediate scrutiny. The
standard also applies—regardless of the type of speech
involved—to time, place, and manner restrictions193 (and

190. Nude dancing is an example of expressive conduct falling “within the
outer ambit of the First Amendment’s protection.” See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.,
529 U.S. 277, 290, 296 (2000) (distinguishing between laws that target nudity
containing an erotic message—i.e., erotic dancing—and laws that target all public
nudity and applying O’Brien to the latter); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 405–06 (1989) (holding that desecration of the American flag by burning
qualifies as expressive conduct); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cnty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 505 (1969) (concluding that “the wearing of an armband for the purpose
of expressing certain views . . . was . . . closely akin to ‘pure speech’”); Brown v.
Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141–43 (1966) (reiterating that free speech rights “are
not confined to verbal expression” and concluding that a peaceful sit-in to protest
racial segregation qualifies as expressive conduct).
191. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746–48 (1978) (stating
that “of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most
limited First Amendment protection” and declining to apply strict scrutiny to a
content restriction on speech that would be protected in other contexts); Red Lion
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386, 390 (1969) (weighing the rights of viewers
and listeners against the rights of broadcasters and concluding that “differences
in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment
standards applied to them”).
192. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 485–86 (1996)
(determining that a ban on commercial speech that is neither false nor misleading
“does not satisfy even the less than strict standard that generally applies in
commercial speech cases under Central Hudson”); see also Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980) (establishing
definitively that commercial speech receives lesser protection than core speech,
requiring an analysis that “turns on the nature both of the expression and of the
governmental interests served by its regulation”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761, 771 (1976) (stating that
“speech does not lose its First Amendment protection because money is spent to
project it” and weighing the respective societal and government interests in the
free flow of commercial information).
193. See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2534–41 (2014) (applying
intermediate scrutiny after concluding that a Massachusetts buffer zone law was
a content-neutral time, place, or manner regulation); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S.
703, 719 (2000) (identifying Colorado’s buffer zone law as a time, place, manner
regulation and applying Ward); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798
(1989) (stating that time, place, manner regulations “must be narrowly tailored to
serve the government’s legitimate, content-neutral interests but that it need not
be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so”).
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injunctions)194 on speech, as well as to legislative attempts to
mitigate secondary effects of speech.195 Intermediate scrutiny
undoubtedly applies to a broader swath of speech than either
rational basis or strict scrutiny. In a characteristically animated
dissent in 1994, the late Justice Antonin Scalia chided the Court
for its assumption that intermediate scrutiny constitutes “some
kind of default standard.”196 The context in that case was a
speech-free buffer zone around a Florida abortion clinic,197 but
Scalia’s sentiment was correct in a broader sense—intermediate
scrutiny has become a multi-purpose staple of First Amendment
jurisprudence.198 Indeed, it seems intermediate scrutiny
increasingly applies to any speech not readily categorizable.
Professional speech is a particularly glaring example of “not
readily categorizable” speech. In 1999, Robert Post provided a
succinct definition of the type of professional speech to which I am
referring: “speech uttered in the course of professional practice as
distinct from speech uttered by a professional.”199 At various
points, I refer to speech of the latter type—i.e., speech uttered by
a professional—as “context-divorced speech.” If a physician
comments as a private citizen on an issue of public interest, then
that physician is engaging in context-divorced speech.
194. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (“[W]hen
evaluating a content-neutral injunction . . . the challenged provisions of the
injunction [must] burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant
government interest.”).
195. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 56–57 (1986) (noting that a
time, place, manner restriction on adult film theaters may be justified if the
restriction is directed “at the secondary effects of such theaters on the
surrounding community”).
196. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 792 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 757–60 (describing the factual background of the case including
the order prohibiting petitioners from engaging in certain activities).
198. See Bhagwat, supra note 184, at 784 (noting that strict scrutiny is limited
to content-based speech regulations and rational basis is “rarely invoked”); see
also Sullivan, supra note 187, at 297 (arguing that intermediate scrutiny is
applied whenever “[a] set of cases comes along that just can’t be steered readily
onto the strict scrutiny or rationality track”); Wexler, supra note 188, at 300
(“Intermediate scrutiny is one of the Court’s most frequently employed balancing
techniques.”).
199. Robert C. Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment
Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 947 (2007)
(quoting Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the
Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 834 (1999)).
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However, that a practical definition of professional speech can
be articulated is far from conclusive.200 In the legal sense, it is
unclear whether there is such a thing as professional speech at
all.201 Certainly the Supreme Court has never explicitly recognized
it.202 Notably, the Court has taken pains to demarcate discernible
lines between other categories of speech.
Obscenity does not include graphic violence;203 sexually
explicit material is not by definition obscenity;204 pornography is
200. It is worth noting that there are many professionals who might qualify
as “professional speakers.” However, the Court’s professional speech doctrine is
not any clearer with respect to one profession over another. See generally, Agency
for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205 (2013) (NGOs); Holder
v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (professional advocacy services);
Milavetz v. United States, 559 U.S. 229 (2010) (bankruptcy attorneys); Legal
Servs. Corp. v. Velasquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (public interest lawyers); Gentile
v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) (lawyers); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the
Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (professional fundraisers). Given the subject matter of
this Article, I have chosen to focus exclusively on physician speech qua
professional speech.
201. See, e.g., Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238,
1258 (2016) (stating that “the Supreme Court has never identified a category of
‘professional speech’ for First Amendment purposes”); Jennifer M. Keighley,
Physician Speech and Mandatory Ultrasound Laws: The First Amendment’s Limit
on Compelled Ideological Speech, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2347, 2353 (2013)
(describing professional speech rights as doctrinally “unclear and opaque”); Post,
supra note 130, at 944 (noting that the Supreme Court has not resolved the issue
and “[s]cholars have taken widely different views about the constitutional status
of physicians’ speech”); Timothy Zick, Professional Rights Speech, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1289, 1293 (2015) (“[I]t is unclear whether there is a category of “professional
speech” that is subject to minimal or no First Amendment scrutiny.”); Jacob M.
Victor, Note, Regulating Sexual Orientation Change Efforts: The California
Approach, Its Limitations, and Potential Alternatives, 123 YALE L.J. 1532,
1554– 55 (2014) (exploring the blurry “line between speech that is incidental to
professional conduct and protected speech”).
202. The Supreme Court has at least not addressed professional speech as a
separate and distinct category from commercial speech or regulable professional
conduct. Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, slip
op. at 8 (2018) (“But this Court has not recognized ‘professional speech’ as a
separate category of speech.”).
203. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Assn., 564 U.S. 786, 793 (2011)
(rejecting “a State’s attempt to shoehorn speech about violence into obscenity” and
concluding that “speech about violence is not obscene”).
204. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974) (finding that the
film at issue showed “in a broader sense, sex . . . including [scenes wherein]
‘ultimate sexual acts’ [are] . . . taking place” but concluding it did not qualify as
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legally differentiable from child pornography;205 “fighting words”
and “true threats” are separate categories of speech.206 Indeed, as
a general matter, the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence is
fairly nuanced. And yet to the extent that the Court has considered
professional speech at all, it has until recently only done so
tangentially. The abortion cases illustrate the most obvious
examples of this phenomenon.
1. Planned Parenthood v. Casey
In 1992, the Supreme Court granted a re-assessment of many
of the constitutional questions first raised in Roe v. Wade.207 In
doing so, the Court provided arguably the most defensible
statement for professional speech as a protected category for the
ensuing twenty-six years. Ironically, it did so using language of
such ambiguity that commentators have described the passage as
“cryptic,”208 “puzzling,”209 and “limited.”210 At least one
commentator speculated that the Court did not intend to
meaningfully address professional speech at all.211 Rather, the
Court “simply blundered” in referencing the First Amendment in
a due process analysis.212

legally obscene).
205. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982) (finding the Miller
standard for obscenity an unsatisfactory solution to the problem of child
pornography).
206. Though true threats are unprotected under the same rationale as
fighting words, the two categories are recognized as separate. Compare
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (defining fighting words),
with Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (defining true threats).
207. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
208. Haupt, supra note 201, at 1259.
209. Post, supra note 199, at 946.
210. Keighley, supra note 201, at 2356.
211. See Nadia N. Sawicki, Informed Consent as Compelled Professional
Speech: Fictions, Facts, and Open Questions, 50 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 11, 38
(2016) (hypothesizing that other commentators missed the mark in their theories
and that the Court did not intend to directly address professional speech and that
it was incidental in their decision in Casey).
212. Id.
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At issue in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey213 were five provisions of Pennsylvania’s Abortion Control
Act.214 Much of the content outlined in the provisions mirrored
content the Court had found objectionable in earlier cases.215
Pennsylvania’s Act structured abortion discussions under the
auspices of informed consent. Physicians in Pennsylvania, as in the
earlier cases, were required to advise pregnant women of the
medical risks involved; the availability of medical assistance
benefits for prenatal care, childbirth and neonatal care; and the
availability of public and private agencies to provide assistance

213. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
214. See id. at 844 (“At issue in these cases are five provisions of the
Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as amended in 1988 and 1989.”).
215. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,
444–45 (1983) (concluding disclosures were medically inappropriate suggesting
abortion was a dangerous procedure). Akron, Ohio’s city ordinance required
physicians to orally inform women seeking abortions that “abortion is a major
surgical procedure” with physical and psychological complications. Id. at 445. The
ordinance also mandated a verbal and detailed description of “the anatomical and
physiological characteristics of the particular unborn child,” accompanied by the
statement that “the unborn child is a human life from the moment of conception.”
Id. at 444. The Court concluded that the required disclosures were not only
medically inappropriate, requiring “at best speculation by the physician,” but
further constituted “‘a parade of horribles’ intended to suggest that abortion is a
particularly dangerous procedure.” Id. at 444–45; see also Thornburg v. Am. Coll.
of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 764 (1986) (determining the
statute’s informational requirements were facially unconstitutional). At issue in
Thornburg were provisions of Pennsylvania’s Abortion Control Act prescribing
the elements of informed consent to abortion. The Court held that the required
disclosures—which mandated a physician-delivered description of fetal
characteristics; presentation of a list of agencies available to provide prenatal,
childbirth, and neonatal care; and a statement that the father is liable for child
support—were nonmedical, irrelevant, and inappropriate. Id. at 762–63. The
Court concluded:
Forcing the physician or counselor to present the materials and the list
to the woman makes him or her in effect an agent of the State in
treating the woman and places his or her imprimatur upon both the
materials and the list. All this is, or comes close to being, state medicine
imposed upon the woman, not the professional medical guidance she
seeks, and it officially structures—as it obviously was intended to
do— the dialogue between the woman and her physician.
Id. at 763 (internal citations omitted). The Court found the informational
requirements facially unconstitutional. Id. at 764.
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during and after pregnancy.216 As in earlier cases, Pennsylvania
mandated a 24-hour waiting period between the patient’s giving of
informed consent and performance of the abortion.217 And, finally,
again as in earlier cases, the Pennsylvanian legislators mandated
a statement advising pregnant women of the biological father’s
liability.218
Aside from an earlier Title X case, which was limited by its
facts to contexts involving federal funding,219 the First Amendment
had yet to merit independent consideration in the Court’s abortion
jurisprudence. In Casey, the Court granted it that independent
consideration—in all of two sentences. “To be sure,” the Court
stated in a joint opinion signed by only three Justices, “the
physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated,
but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable
licensing and regulation by the State.”220 We see no constitutional
infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the
information mandated by the State here.”221 Without directly
overturning any of its earlier case law, the Court nonetheless

216. Compare Regulation of Abortions, Akron Codified Ordinances, ch. 1870,
§ 1870.06, Ordinance No. 160-1978, invalidated by Akron, 462 U.S. 416 (1983)
(requiring attending physicians make specified statements to assure a truly
informed consent), with 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205 (1982) (providing a
comprehensive list of required disclosures for doctors performing abortions with
criminal penalties for violation).
217. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205(a)(1) (listing a disclosure requirement
twenty-four hours prior to the planned abortion).
218. Id. § 3205(2)(iii) (1989). The Thornburgh court took issue with the
liability provision in 1986. Justice Blackmun observed that in some cases a
liability reminder might have a destructive effect on the doctor–patient
relationship. The Court determined, “a victim of rape should not have to hear
gratuitous advice that an unidentified perpetrator is liable for her
support . . . [u]nder the guise of informed consent.” Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 763.
In the amended provision at issue in Casey, the legislature exempted physicians
from issuing a liability advisory in cases of rape. Section 3205(2)(iii) (“The father
of the unborn child is liable to assist in the support of her child, even in instances
where he has offered to pay for the abortion. In the case of rape, this information
may be omitted.”).
219. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 202 (1991).
220. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992)
(internal citations omitted).
221. Id.
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“overrule[d] those parts of [earlier case law]” deemed inconsistent
with the State’s legitimate interest in protecting potential life.222
Since Casey, legal scholars—and more notably, lower court
judges—have spilled significant ink speculating, arguing, and
ultimately disagreeing about its First Amendment import.223
Whatever level of importance the Court meant to ascribe to
professional speech with those two “on-the-fly” sentences,224 most
commentators agree that the intention was clearly not to provide
a coherent framework for assessing future First Amendment
claims.225 Thus, the Court’s decision in 2017 to grant certiorari in
National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra226 was
potentially momentous. For the first time since Casey, the question
of physicians’ free speech rights was again under Supreme Court
scrutiny, and in the abortion context no less.

222. Id. at 870. Note that even absent explicit overturn, Akron and
Thornburgh were not good law after Casey. See, e.g., Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life
Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2384 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“These
cases [Akron and Thornburgh], however . . . are no longer good law [after
Casey].”).
223. See, e.g., Haupt, supra note 201, at 1246 (“There may be less desire to
protect professional speech concerned with abortion— and more tolerance for
government demands to read inaccurate, legislatively drafted scripts, compelled
descriptions of mandatory ultrasounds and the like— based on moral disproval.”);
Sawicki, supra note 211, at 14 (addressing the lower court difficulty of
interpreting the precedent set by Casey with regard to constitutional standards
for reviewing state regulations of physician speech); Jennifer M. Keighley, supra
note 201, at 2348 (questioning the First Amendment implications of the compelled
speech mandated by state laws after the decision in Casey specifically in the
context of ultrasound procedures); Lindsey Schmidt, Note, The Constitutional
Right to an Abortion Does Not Encompass the Right to Be Uninformed: The Fourth
Circuit’s Puzzling Approach to Evaluating Mandatory Ultrasound Provisions in
Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014), 95 NEB. L. REV. 1124, 1156–57
(2017) (discussing the Fourth Circuit’s conclusions related to a North Carolina
law and addressing the potential flaws with the decision in light of precedent in
Casey).
224. Rodney A. Smolla, Professional Speech and the First Amendment, 119 W.
VA. L. REV. 67, 81 (2016).
225. See id. (discussing a previous scholar’s work and how that work did not
go far enough to state that Casey provided “virtually no guidance as to the general
constitutional status of professional speech”).
226. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).

PHYSICIANS’ FIRST AMENDMENT

619

2. National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra
The specific question under consideration in Becerra was: “Do
disclosures required by a California reproductive rights law violate
protections arising from the free speech clause of the First
Amendment?”227 The law in question, California’s Reproductive
FACT (Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and
Transparency) Act had two core provisions. The first required
licensed clinics228 in California to tell pregnant women (via posted
or printed notice in no less than 22- or 14-point type, respectively)
that the State provides free or low-cost access to family planning
services, including abortion.229 The second provision required
unlicensed clinics to post a notice disclosing their unlicensed status
and to include in all their advertisements the same disclosure.230
Per the Act, the notice included in advertisements needed to be “in
the same size or larger font than the surrounding text.”231
In their court briefs, Petitioners, two pro-life crisis pregnancy
centers—one licensed and the other unlicensed—argued that the
Reproductive FACT Act violated the First Amendment. More
specifically, the licensed clinic argued that compelling them to
distribute a government-drafted script advertising abortion—i.e.,
“the very practice that petitioners are devoted to opposing”—“at
the same time petitioners [are trying] to dissuade women from
choosing that option” effectively transformed them into the State’s
mouthpiece.232 The unlicensed clinic argued in a similar vein.
227. National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, OYEZ,
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1140 (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
228. The FACT Act defined such clinics as those providing obstetric
ultrasounds, obstetric sonograms, prenatal care, contraception counseling,
pregnancy testing and diagnosis, prenatal sonography, or abortion services. See
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123471(a)(1)–(6) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 4 of
2019 Reg. Sess.) (defining licensed covered facilities as those providing two or
more of the listed services).
229. See id. § 123472(a)(2)(A) (“A public notice posted in a conspicuous place
where individuals wait that may be easily read by those seeking services from the
facility. The notice shall be at least 8.5 inches by 11 inches and written in no less
than 22-point type.”).
230. Id. § 123472(b)(3)
231. Id.
232. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371
(2018).
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Under the Act’s definition, a facility that advertised the
availability of free resources to encourage childbirth (e.g., prenatal
vitamins, diapers, baby clothes), would count as an “unlicensed
clinic.” Thus, such a facility’s two-word advertisement—FREE
DIAPERS—would need to be accompanied by a twenty-nine-word
disclosure, in thirteen languages, with the same size font.233
Petitioners argued that “[w]hile the centers exist to support
childbirth, the Act forces them to point the way to ending unborn
babies’ lives.”234
With respect to licensed clinics, California’s reply brief leaned
heavily on an argument that had been gaining traction in many of
the lower courts, including the Ninth Circuit.235 Namely, that
notices of the type required by the FACT Act did not count as
self-expression.236 Respondents argued that notifying patients that
abortions are available as an option from other providers did not
amount to either an endorsement or a referral.237 Indeed, the State
noted that “although California’s law leaves clinics entirely free to
expressly disavow the notice, no ‘disavowal’ should be necessary,
because the required notice does not suggest any ‘avowal’ in the
first place.”238 With respect to unlicensed clinics, Respondents
argued that the disclosure served to protect pregnant women from
mistaking unlicensed clinics for medical providers and was, like
the disclosure for licensed clinics, neutral and non-directive.239
233. “This facility is not licensed as a medical facility by the State of California
and has no licensed medical provider who provides or directly supervises the
provision of services.” CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123472(b) (West, Westlaw
through Ch. 4 of 2019 Reg. Sess.).
234. Brief for Petitioners at 1–2, Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v.
Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (No. 16-1140), 2018 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 63,
at *11.
235. See infra Part III.B.1.
236. See Brief for the State Respondents at 43, Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life
Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (No. 16-1140), 2018 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 650, at *75 (“Patients understand that a clinic’s role in serving as a conduit
for such notices is not self-expression.”) (citation omitted).
237. See id. at 38 (noting that the Court is wary of government attempts to
compel endorsement).
238. Id. at 43–44 (citations omitted).
239. See id. at 21–22 (discussing unlicensed facilities whose activities include
“obstetric ultrasounds,” “prenatal care,” “pregnancy testing or diagnosis,” and
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In the nearly three decades since Casey was handed down, the
Supreme Court had said little about professional speech.240 With
respect to context-divorced speech, however, the Court’s
jurisprudence was considerably better developed. Several opinions
had addressed context-divorced speech in the realm of commercial
advertising,241 which prompted some lower courts to apply the
commercial speech case law to evaluate professional speech
claims,242 albeit controversially.243 Other courts interpreted Casey
as both identifying a distinct category of speech (i.e., professional)
and ascribing to it a lower, rational basis level value.244 And still
other courts subscribed to the opposite conclusion and accordingly
applied heightened—even strict— scrutiny in professional speech
cases.245 Given the absence of guiding doctrine from the High
Court, the lower courts, by necessity, actively developed their own,
often divergent, lines of professional speech jurisprudence.246
“collect[ing] health information from clients” (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 123471(b) (West 2015)).
240. See Eugene Volokh, The Law of Compelled Speech, 97 TEX. L. REV. 355,
388 (2018) (describing Becerra and Casey as key precedents in the context of
compelled speech).
241. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011) (considering
First Amendment protection for pharmaceutical marketers and data miners);
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 629
(1985) (considering attorneys’ free speech rights with respect to soliciting
business via advertising); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756–57 (1976) (considering professional pharmacists’ free
speech rights in the context of price advertising for prescription drugs).
242. See King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 234 (3d Cir. 2014) (“We
believe that commercial and professional speech share important qualities and,
thus, that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review for
prohibitions aimed at either category.”).
243. See Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1264
(2016) (arguing that courts are mistaken in analogizing professional speech and
commercial speech because the underlying speech interests are fundamentally
different).
244. See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying
rational basis after determining that a law’s effect on free speech interests was
merely incidental).
245. See, e.g., Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1246 (11th
Cir. 2014) (“[W]hen speech is prohibited rather than compelled,
reasonableness-scrutiny is ratcheted up to intermediate scrutiny.”);
Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 814 F.3d 1159, 1192 (11th Cir. 2015) (applying
strict scrutiny but noting that the outcome would be the same if the court applied
intermediate scrutiny).
246. See Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech and the Content-Neutrality
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Unsurprisingly then, analysts across the political spectrum were
hopeful that Becerra would ameliorate the circuit split and provide
the coherent framework omitted in Casey.247
In a 5–4 opinion, penned by Justice Clarence Thomas, the
Court struck down both provisions of the Reproductive FACT
Act.248 Thomas began his analysis by belying the idea that a
category of speech called “professional speech,” separate and
differentiable from speech qua speech, exists.249 “Speech is not
unprotected merely because it is uttered by ‘professionals’”250
Justice Thomas wrote, in a statement reminiscent of Robert
Post.251 At first glance, the statement reads as definitive:
professional speech as a unique category of speech does not exist.252
Rather, professional speech is speech like any other; it is not, to
use Thomas’s phrasing, “subject to different rules.”253 In the
ensuing analysis, however, Justice Thomas was explicit not only in
carving out instances in which professional speech is, in fact,
subject to different rules—but also in moderating his initial
statement to the point of near negation.254 To the first point,
Justice Thomas acknowledged that both (1) compelled disclosures
Trap, 127 YALE L.J. FORUM 150, 167 (2017) (“Several competing approaches to
professional speech have emerged as such cases have percolated through the
federal courts.”).
247. See, e.g., id. at 171 (advocating for the Eleventh Circuit’s framework);
Rodney A. Smolla, Professional Speech and the First Amendment, 119 W. VA. L.
REV. 67, 112 (2016) (concluding that professional speech should receive the
“highest levels of constitutional protection”).
248. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361,
2377 (2018) (“Even if California had presented a nonhypothetical justification for
the unlicensed notice, the FACT Act unduly burdens protected speech.”).
249. See id. at 2371 (“[T]his Court has not recognized ‘professional speech’ as
a separate category of speech.”).
250. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371–72.
251. See supra note 199 and accompanying text (regarding Post’s definition of
“speech uttered in the course of professional practice as distinct from speech
uttered by a professional”).
252. See id. at 2372 (noting the Court’s reluctance to add new categories to
exclude from constitutional protection).
253. Id. at 2371.
254. See id. at 2372 (“This Court’s precedents have applied a lower level of
scrutiny to laws that compel disclosures in certain contexts.”).
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by professionals of “purely factual and uncontroversial
information,” and (2) professional speech that is closely tied to
professional conduct, are subject to a lesser standard of review.255
To the second point, Justice Thomas conceded that the type of
professional speech that does not fall within one of the two
approved exceptions is “a difficult category to define with
precision.”256 He further stated that even when such a feat is
accomplished—that is, even when a court is able to accurately
determine that a given professional is speaking on a topic neither
purely factual nor uncontroversial, and is speaking in such a way
that the speech is divorced of conduct—there are nonetheless
persuasive reasons for which the professional speech might still be
“exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles.”257 At this
point, a critical observer might reasonably ask: which reasons are
persuasive? Justice Thomas expounded on this point with only one
sentence: “We do not foreclose the possibility that some such
reason exists.”258 Or, put another way, there might be such a thing
as professional speech—sometimes.
Ultimately, Becerra’s outcome is perhaps best described as a
loss for the pro-choice agenda and, if anything, a tepid win for free
speech.259 Certainly, it did little to resolve the existing circuit
split.260 For those hoping for elucidation of professional speech’s
First Amendment standing, the decision likely raises more
questions than it answered. A coherent framework—for
identifying professional speech in the first place, and for assigning
255. Id. at 2372–74 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of
Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992)).
256. Id. at 2375.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. See Emma Green, The Supreme Court Hands a Win to the Pro-Life
Movement,
ATLANTIC
(June
26,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/the-supreme-court-handsa-win-to-the-pro-life-movement/563738/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (“Looking
ahead, the Court’s decision . . . may be most consequential as a boundary line for
the way the government treats pro-life groups.”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
260. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361,
2375 (2018) (recognizing that there is the possibility that professional speech
should be exempt from First Amendment principles).
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it an appropriate level of judicial scrutiny in the second—remains
elusive.
IV. Physician Speech: Low-, Medium-, or High-Value?
Progress is rarely value-neutral.261 Some measure of societal
distress, if not outright controversy, frequently accompanies
intellectual advancement.262 Within the last ten years the
accumulation of medical knowledge on three diverse topics—gun
violence, sexual orientation, and abortion sequelae—has triggered
an amalgam of cases that have divided legal opinion on the First
Amendment value of physician speech.263 For our purposes, these
cases have predictive value for anticipating legal responses to
restrictions on physician speech in the PWGS context.
A. Physician Gag Laws and Gun Safety
In July 2010, Amber Ullman entered the pediatrician’s office
in Ocala, Florida for her daughter’s four-month check-up.264
Following a series of health-and-safety questions—for example,
“Do you have a pool? Do you use a car seat?”—Dr. Chris Okonkwo
asked: “Do you keep a gun in the house?”265 When Ms. Ullman
261. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV.
43, 92 (1989) (asserting that constitutional interpretation inevitably invokes a
subjective process of examining the intentions of the drafters and the ratifiers
and deciding whose views are more important).
262. See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public
Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 170–71 (2006) (reasoning that disagreements
over the consequences of law stem from differences in values resulting in
polarized beliefs which persist in the face of scientific advancement).
263. See infra Parts IV.A–C (analyzing recent cases regarding gun violence,
sexual orientation, and abortion sequelae).
264. See Fred Hiers, Family and Pediatrician Tangle Over Gun Question,
OCALA
STAR
BANNER
(July
23,
2010),
http://www.ocala.com/article/20100723/News/604191215 (last visited Apr. 16,
2019) (reporting a disagreement between a physician and a parent regarding
questions about gun ownership) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
265. See id.
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refused to answer, Dr. Okonkwo completed the exam but advised
the Ullmans that they would need to find another pediatrician.266
He later told the local paper he would have done the same if Ms.
Ullman had refused to disclose information about whether she had
a pool or smoked in the house.267 “I don’t tell them to get rid of the
guns,” Dr. Okonkwo stated, “The purpose [of the question] is to
give [safety] advice.”268
Six months later, prompted by the “Ocala incident,”269 State
Representative Jason Brodeur introduced House Bill 155 as “[a]n
act relating to the privacy of firearm owners.”270 In April 2011, the
Florida Senate passed the Firearms Owners’ Privacy Act
(FOPA).271 Section 790.338 of the Act reads:
A health care practitioner . . . shall respect a patient’s right to
privacy and should refrain from making a written inquiry or
asking questions concerning the ownership of a firearm or
ammunition by the patient or by a family member of the
patient, or the presence of a firearm in a private home . . . .272

The Act further stated that physicians “should refrain from
unnecessarily harassing a patient about firearm ownership during
an examination.”273 Finally, the Act mandated that FOPA
violations were punishable by fines up to $10,000 per offense,
letters of reprimand, probation, suspension, compulsory remedial
education, or permanent revocation of the offender’s medical
license.274 Governor Rick Scott signed the Act into law on June 2,
266. See id. (“[Okonkwo] said he respected a patient’s right not to answer
questions, but it was also his right to no longer treat them.”).
267. See id. (“[T]he doctor and patient have to develop a relationship of trust
and that if parents won’t answer such basic safety questions, how could they trust
each other about more important health issues.”).
268. Id.
269. Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Cross Motions for
Summary Judgment at 1, Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (S.D.
Fla. 2012) (No. 1:11-cv-22026-MCG).
270. H.B. 155, 2011 Leg., 113th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011), 2011 Bill Tracking FL
H.B. 155 (LexisNexis).
271. See id. (reporting on the passage of the bill and its signature by the
governor).
272. FLA. STAT. § 790.338(2) (Westlaw through Apr. 8, 2019).
273. Id. § 790.338(6).
274. See id. §§ 790.338(8), 456.072 (mandating disciplinary action by Florida’s
Board of Medicine).
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2011.275 At least a dozen other states introduced similar legislation
thereafter.276
1. U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida
On June 24, 2011, a group of Florida physicians filed suit in
federal court.277 The complaint alleged First Amendment
violations attendant to physicians’ right to “engage in open and
free exchanges of information and advice with their patients.”278
Plaintiffs filed declarations demonstrating that many physicians
consider firearm inquiries routine in the practice of preventative
medicine.279 Official guidelines issued by the American Academy of
275. See H.B. 155, 2011 Leg., 113th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011), 2011 Bill Tracking
FL H.B. 155 (LexisNexis).
276. See Olga Khazan, The Strange Laws that Dictate What Your Doctor Tells
(Oct.
16,
2015),
You,
ATLANTIC
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/10/the-laws-that-standbetween-you-and-your-doctor/410722/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (“Fourteen
states have introduced similar legislation since [FOPA], though none as
restrictive as Florida’s have been enacted.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); Alexis Macias, When States Practice Medicine: Physician Gag Laws,
97
BULL.
AM.
COLL.
SURGEONS
39,
39–40
(Feb.
1,
2012),
http://bulletin.facs.org/2012/02/when-states-practice-medicine-physician-gaglaws/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (reporting on NRA-sponsored bills in Alabama,
Minnesota, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and West Virginia) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Mobeen H. Rathore, Physician “Gag Laws”
and Gun Safety, 16 AMA J. ETHICS 235, 284 (2014) (stating that twelve other
states followed Florida by introducing physician gag laws).
277. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 1, Wollschlaeger
v. Farmer (Wollschlaeger I), 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (No.
1:11-cv-22026) (seeking declaratory and injunctive relief declaring the law
unconstitutional and preventing enforcement of FOPA).
278. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 1,
Wollschlaeger I, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (No. 1:11-cv-22026).
279. See, e.g., Declaration of Judith Schaechter, MD at ¶ 13, Wollschlaeger I,
880 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (No. 1:11-cv-22026) (“I am afraid this law could be
interpreted as allowing doctors to ask about guns only if they believe a danger to
the patient is imminent—an interpretation that would preclude standard
preventative care as part of my patients’ care.”); Declaration of Dr. Tommy
Schechtman at ¶ 7, Wollschlaeger I, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (No. 1:11-cv-22026) (“I
routinely ask patients during checkups about a long list of risk factors, including
whether guns are present in the home.”); Declaration of Dr. Bernd Wollschlaeger
at ¶ 8, Wollschlaeger I, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (No. 1:11-cv-22026) (“As a family
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Pediatrics, the American Academy of Family Physicians, and the
American College of Physicians similarly validated preventative
firearm inquiries.280
In the district court, the State argued that the Act was not a
speech regulation.281 FOPA “prohibits harassment and
discrimination, not speech,” the State insisted.282 District Court
Judge Marcia Cross was unconvinced.283 “Under this law,” Judge
Cross said, “physicians may ask a new patient complaining of a
stomachache . . . questions regarding household chemicals, risky
recreational activities, sexual conduct, or drugs and alcohol kept
in the home, but not whether the patient owns a firearm.”284 She
classified FOPA’s
provisions as content-based speech
restrictions.285 Acknowledging that the standard for professional
speech was an “unsettled question of law,”286 Judge Cross
nonetheless struck FOPA down as unconstitutional.287 “I need not
decide [here] which standard applies because the State would not
prevail under either test [i.e., heightened or strict],” she stated.288

practitioner, I consider anticipatory guidance regarding safe firearm practices to
be a key part of preventative health consultations, in light of the significant
health risks posed by firearms to my patients.”).
280. See, e.g., M. Denise Dowd & Robert D. Sege, Firearm-Related Injuries
Affecting the Pediatric Population, 130 PEDIATRICS e1416, e1416 (2012) (“The
absence of guns from children’s homes and communities is the most reliable and
effective measure to prevent firearm-related injuries in children and
adolescents.”).
281. See Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment at 1, Wollschlaeger I, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (No.
1:11-cv-22026) (“Section 790.338 does not prohibit speech.”).
282. Id. (capitalization altered).
283. See Wollschlaeger I, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1261 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (“Despite
the State’s arguments to the contrary, the anti-discrimination and
anti-harassment provisions are also content-based.”).
284. Id.
285. Id. (“[FOPA] purports to regulate practitioners’ inquiries,
record-keeping, discrimination, and harassment with respect to one subject
matter only— firearm ownership and possession.”).
286. Id. at 1262–63.
287. See id. at 1267 (“This law chills practitioners’ speech in a way that
impairs the provision of medical care and may ultimately harm the patient.”).
288. Id. at 1263 (citing United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012)
(plurality opinion)).
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The district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment.289
2. The Eleventh Circuit’s Approach
On appeal, the State continued to argue that the Act’s
language—physicians “should refrain” from asking patients about
firearms—was merely hortatory.290 As such, the State argued that
FOPA posed (if anything) only incidental burdens on speech.291
Like the district court, the Eleventh Circuit was unconvinced by
the State’s hortatory argument.292 Unlike the district court, Circuit
Judge Tjoflat found the State’s broader defense compelling.293 The
Act, as he described it, “merely reaffirm[ed] the boundaries
surrounding what constitutes good medical practice.”294 He
eschewed the idea that physicians had any type of free speech
rights within the confines of the physician-patient relationship.295
He reasoned that conversations in the exam room were not
289. See id. at 1270 (enjoining enforcement of the statute).
290. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger II), 760 F.3d 1195,
1207 (11th Cir. 2014) (relaying the State’s argument that the statutory language
does not constitute a bar on speech). At an evidentiary hearing in the district
court, the defense counsel described the State’s position regarding statutory
construction: “It recommends to practitioners that they refrain from asking about
firearm ownership in most cases,” the defense stated, “but it does not prohibit it.”
Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing Before the Honorable Marcia G. Cooke at 29,
Wollschlaeger I, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (No. 1:11-cv-22026) (emphasis added).
Defense counsel also stressed that FOPA contained a good-faith exception,
allowing practitioners to discuss firearms in cases of medical necessity. See H.B.
155 § 790.338(2), 2011 Leg., 113th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011).
291. See Wollschlaeger II, 760 F.3d at 1207 (summarizing the State’s
argument that the District Court erred in its finding that FOPA was facially
unconstitutional).
292. See id. at 1212 (“Laws—such as the Act—that provide for disciplinary
action in case of violation should generally not be interpreted as hortatory.”).
293. See id. at 1217 (“To define the standards of good medical practice and
provide for administrative enforcement of those standards is well within the
State’s long-established authority to regulate the professions.”).
294. Id. at 1215.
295. See id. (“Insofar as Plaintiffs claim a generalized interest in being able
to speak freely to their patients, such conversation (if not relevant to medical care)
is outside the boundaries of the physician–patient relationship.”).
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speech—they were medicine.296 Writing for a divided three-judge
panel, Judge Tjoflat wrote: “The Act simply informs physicians
that inquiring about a private matter irrelevant to medical care is
not part of the practice of good medicine, and that, as always, a
physician may face discipline for not practicing good medicine.”297
The court concluded that FOPA regulated professional conduct,
not speech, and thus did not implicate the First Amendment.298
Circuit Judge Wilson disagreed with the majority’s application
of rational basis review.299 “Simply put,” Judge Wilson wrote in his
excoriating dissent, “the Act is a gag order.”300 To his mind,
labeling the speech “conduct” and the speakers “professionals” did
not belie the simple fact that FOPA prohibited conversations about
one topic by one group of speakers.301 Moreover, he considered the
majority’s position “based on a misreading of Casey.”302 Indeed,
contrary to the majority’s assertion that Casey removed the First
Amendment from medical practice entirely,303 the text of that
opinion explicitly said the opposite—i.e., “First Amendment
rights . . . are implicated.”304 By Judge Wilson’s reading, Casey had
applied some level of First Amendment scrutiny to the
Pennsylvania regulation, though ascertaining which level from
two sentences was an admittedly harder task.305 After considering
Casey’s application in other circuits, and parsing the opinion itself
for clues, Judge Wilson concluded that Casey “applied something
akin to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny,” and that nothing
296. See id. (describing inquiries into gun ownership as “conduct outside of
the bounds of good medical practice”).
297. Id. at 1219–20.
298. See id. at 1217, 1230 (reversing the district court).
299. See id. at 1239 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (asserting that the law would fail
under strict or intermediate scrutiny).
300. Id. at 1230.
301. Id. at 1231, 1236.
302. Id. at 1243.
303. See id. at 1222 n.16 (majority opinion) (stating that the Casey court
allowed states “to some extent regulate physician speech within the confines of
the physician-patient relationship ‘as part of the practice of medicine’ without
violating the First Amendment”).
304. Id. at 1245 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992)).
305. Id. (Wilson, J., dissenting) (recognizing the Court’s lack of clarity
regarding the standard applied in Casey).
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less should be applied to FOPA.306 He noted, also, the legal
implications of the majority’s decision—namely, that every
one-to-one professional relationship would now be regulable
without scrutiny.307 “I do not so simply identify a slippery slope,”
Judge Wilson wrote, “[rather,] today’s decision brings us to the
bottom of that slope.”308 He concluded, “health care in Florida [will
be] worse, not better.”309
3. The Eleventh Circuit Redux
In July 2015, the same three-judge panel issued a revised
opinion.310 The tone of it suggested that in the intervening year,
Judge Wilson’s dissent had gained some traction. Judge Tjoflat,
306. Id. at 1245–46, 1256 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (“Even if Casey applied
something less than intermediate scrutiny, [Zauderer] confirms that
intermediate scrutiny applies here.”).
307. See id. at 1253 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (positing a hypothetical in which
a state prohibits all discussions about firearm safety). In Becerra, the Supreme
Court echoed Judge Wilson’s concern, noting:
As defined by the courts of appeals, the professional speech doctrine
would cover a wide array of individuals—doctors, lawyers, nurses,
physical therapists, truck drivers, bartenders, barbers, and many
others. . . . All that is required to make something a “profession,”
according to these courts, is that it involves personalized services and
requires a professional license from the State. But that gives the State
unfettered power to reduce a group’s First Amendment rights by
simply imposing a licensing requirement.
Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2375 (2018)
(citations omitted).
308. Wollschlaeger II, 760 F.3d 1195, 1249–50 (11th Cir. 2014) (Wilson, J.,
dissenting).
309. Id. at 1257 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (noting that numerous medical
associations support his conclusion regarding FOPA’s detrimental effect on
health care).
310. Eleventh Circuit Judges Tjoflat and Wilson, joined by Northern District
of Alabama Judge Coogler, vacated their original opinion sua sponte, mooting
Petitioners’ request for rehearing en banc. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla.
(Wollschlaeger III), 797 F.3d 859, 868 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Petition for
Rehearing En Banc at 3–4, Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d 859 (No. 12-14009) (“The
majority erroneously held that a government may, under guise of regulating
medical practice, silence physicians from providing medical advice even to squelch
a perceived political viewpoint.”).
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writing again for the majority, began by observing that “[t]he
State’s analysis,” which the court had validated and adopted in its
first opinion, “proceeds at such a high level of generality that all
laws regulating the practice of a profession . . . would always pass
muster under the First Amendment.”311 To appropriately narrow
the analysis, the majority devised a four-category grid to capture
the universe of physician speech: (1) speech to the public in
furtherance of medicine; (2) speech to a patient in furtherance of
medicine; (3) speech to a patient on a matter irrelevant to
medicine; and (4) speech to the public on a matter irrelevant to
medicine.312 The majority—retreating from its original position
that FOPA regulated only professional conduct—classified firearm
inquiries as category 2 speech.313 Reasoning that regulation of
professional practices had long been within the purview of the
states’ police power, the court held that category 2 speech was
subject to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny.314 The higher
level of scrutiny notwithstanding, the outcome was the same, by
the same 2–1 vote.315 Judge Wilson, again the lone dissenter,
commented: “The Majority is now persuaded that the Act is subject
to some level of scrutiny under the First Amendment. It is the
analysis that follows where we part ways . . . .”316 Judge Wilson’s
second dissent was similar to his first.317 It turned on his belief that
the majority was devaluing professional speech “precisely because
the speakers are so qualified.”318 Put another way, a speaker’s

311. Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 884 (emphasis in original).
312. See id. at 888 n.15 (providing a visual grid to illustrate the categories).
Note that Bandy Lee et al.’s The Dangerous Case of Donald Trump would likely
fall into the court’s fourth category. See generally THE DANGEROUS CASE OF
DONALD TRUMP (Bandy X. Lee ed. 2017) (compiling assessments from
psychiatrists and mental health experts regarding Donald Trump’s mental state).
313. See Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 891 n.17 (concluding that FOPA
regulated professional speech).
314. See id. at 893, 895–96 (discussing the duty of the states to protect the
public against incompetent or untrustworthy professionals).
315. See id. at 901 (upholding FOPA but cautioning that the decision does not
reflect the propriety of the law).
316. Id. at 901 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
317. See id. (Wilson, J., dissenting) (renewing his argument that the law does
not survive intermediate scrutiny).
318. Id. at 914 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
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professional status should not serve as a basis for denying her First
Amendment protections.319
Two months later, the Eleventh Circuit issued an order
requesting memorandums from the Wollschlaeger litigants. The
court asked that they address whether Reed v. Town of Gilbert,320
a First Amendment Supreme Court case decided in June 2015,
necessitated the application of strict scrutiny in the instant case.321
Then, in December 2015, the same three-judge panel issued a
third, revised opinion.322 The majority again agreed with the
plaintiffs that FOPA was a content-based speech regulation.323
More promising, the majority accepted the plaintiffs’ assertion that
Reed required the application of strict scrutiny.324 But, in a bizarre
twist,325 the majority concluded both that the State had a
compelling interest (in protecting patient privacy and Second
Amendment rights),326 and that FOPA was narrowly tailored to
advance that interest.327 By the same 2–1 vote, the majority held
319. See id. (Wilson, J., dissenting) (“[D]octors were silenced because their
speech was causing patients to question whether the safety concerns associated
with firearm ownership outweighed the benefits.”).
320. 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
321. See Memorandum to Counsel or Parties, Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d 859,
884 (11th Cir. 2015) (No. 12-14009) (directing submission within twenty days).
Reed held that town ordinances restricting the size, number, duration, and
location of temporary directional signs violated the First Amendment. The Court
applied strict scrutiny. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2224 (2015).
322. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger IV), 814 F.3d 1159,
1168 (11th Cir. 2015) (upholding FOPA).
323. See id. at 1186 (applying Reed and conceding that FOPA applies to
speech based on the “topic discussed”).
324. See id. at 1186 n.14 (“The Court seemed to suggest that strict scrutiny
applies broadly to all content-based regulations of speech.” (quoting Reed, 135 S.
Ct. at 2224–25)).
325. Recall that challenged laws are never supposed to survive “fatal in fact”
strict scrutiny. See supra Part III.A and note 173 (concerning the levels of scrutiny
and Professor Gerald Gunther assertion that strict scrutiny is typically fatal in
fact).
326. See Wollschlaeger IV, 814 F.3d at 1193–95 (“Florida rightfully treats the
privacy of [gun ownership] as sacrosanct and acts aggressively to protect it.”).
327. See id. at 1199 (querying “what narrower way to advance this interest
could there be than by requiring physicians to base any inquiry or record-keeping
about firearm ownership on a genuine, subjective determination of medical
need?”).
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that “the Act survives even strict scrutiny . . . .”328 Again in lone
dissent, Judge Wilson wrote: “I decline to pen another dissent
responding to the Majority’s evolving rationale. I rest on my
previous dissents.”329
In February 2016, the Eleventh Circuit finally granted the
plaintiffs’ request for the case to be reheard, this time en banc,
before a full panel of the eleven sitting judges.330 In a nod to the
preceding three panel decisions—“each using a different First
Amendment standard of review”331—the court began by
recognizing that the First Amendment is “sometimes . . . difficult
to apply.”332 But what the preceding panels had found difficult, the
full court disposed of easily.333 Quoting one of Judge Wilson’s
earlier dissents, the court intoned, “[S]aying that restrictions on
writing and speaking are merely incidental to speech is like saying
that limitations on walking and running are merely incidental to
ambulation.”334 The court similarly agreed with Judge Wilson’s
“bottom of the slope” argument:
If rationality were the standard, the government could—based
on its disagreement with the message being conveyed—easily tell
architects that they cannot propose buildings in the style of I.M.
Pei, or general contractors that they cannot suggest the use of
cheaper foreign steel in construction projects, or accountants that
they cannot discuss legal tax avoidance techniques, and so on and
so on.335
After determining that the standard was not rational basis,
however, the court declined to decide anything further.336 Circuit
Judge Jordan, the majority’s representative on this final round,
held that FOPA’s provisions could not withstand even heightened
328. Id. at 1186.
329. Id. at 1202 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
330. See Order Granting Petition for Rehearing at 2, Wollschlaeger v.
Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger V), 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017) (No. 12-14009).
331. Wollschlaeger V, 848 F.3d 1293, 1301 (11th Cir. 2017).
332. Id. at 1300.
333. See id. at 1301 (analyzing with heightened scrutiny under Sorrell v. IMS
Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 553 (2011)).
334. Id. at 1308.
335. Id. at 1311.
336. See id. (“Because these provisions fail to satisfy heightened scrutiny
under Sorrell, they obviously would not withstand strict scrutiny.”).
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scrutiny, obviating any need to determine whether strict scrutiny
should apply.337 The court concluded that firearm inquiries—even
if conducted via “blanket questioning”—would not lead to the
practice of bad medicine.338 At its crux, the Eleventh Circuit’s final
opinion endorsed the aphorism “knowledge is power” or, to use the
court’s phrasing, “information can save lives.”339 Judge Wilson
concurred, taking care to note that he would apply strict scrutiny
but reach the same result.340 FOPA was struck down as
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.341
The Eleventh Circuit’s seesawing between levels of judicial
scrutiny—from rational basis to intermediate to strict, and back
again—is telling. Its four incongruous opinions highlight the
marked opacity of the legal standard for professional speech.342
B. Sexual Orientation Conversion Therapy
Sexual orientation conversion efforts (SOCE) refer to
psychoanalytic techniques designed to redirect same-sex sexual
desires toward people of a different sex.343 More succinctly, SOCE
is talk therapy meant to cure homosexuality.344 There is no
337. See id. (declining to decide whether strict scrutiny should apply).
338. Id. at 1316 (“There is no claim, much less any evidence, that routine
questions to patients about the ownership of firearms are medically
inappropriate, ethically problematic, or practically ineffective.”).
339. Id. at 1313 (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011)).
340. Id. at 1324 (Wilson, J., concurring).
341. Id. at 1323 (“In this quintessential First Amendment area, the State may
not hinge liability on a phrase so ambiguous in nature.”).
342. See id. at 1310–11 (summarizing jurisprudence regarding the standard
of scrutiny for professional speech).
343. See Healing Arts: Sexual Orientation Change Efforts: Hearing on S.B.
1172 Before the S. Comm. on Bus., Professions & Econ. Dev., 2012 Leg. (Cal. 2012)
(defining “sexual orientation change efforts”).
344. A. Lee Beckstead, Can We Change Sexual Orientation?, 41 ARCHIVES
SEXUAL BEHAV. 121, 123 (2012). Historically, SOCE is not limited to talk
therapies. For an expanded discussion of historical methodologies, see David B.
Cruz, Controlling Desires: Sexual Orientation Conversion and the Limits of
Knowledge and Law, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1297, 1303–10 (1999) (describing the
evolution of procedures used through history to try and “cure” homosexuality
including surgery, chemicals, drugs, and therapy).
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evidence that SOCE is effective,345 and the American Psychiatric
Association (APA) has explicitly disavowed its use.346 In September
2012, Governor Jerry Brown signed Senate Bill 1172, making
California the first state to ban state-licensed therapists from
performing SOCE on any patient under eighteen years of age.347 A
year later, Governor Chris Christie approved identical legislation,
Assembly Bill 3371, in New Jersey.348
1. Pickup v. Brown: The Ninth Circuit’s Approach
In 2014, two circuit courts—the Ninth Circuit, addressing the
California ban, and the Third Circuit, addressing the New Jersey
ban—confronted legal challenges to SOCE bans.349 In both cases,
plaintiff-counselors alleged free speech violations.350 In the Ninth
345. Annie Bartlett et al., The Response of Mental Health Professionals to
Clients Seeking Help to Change or Redirect Same-Sex Sexual Orientation, 9 BMC
PSYCHIATRY 1, 7 (2009) (summarizing that no recent or earlier published
literature evidences that a person’s sexual orientation can be changed).
346 See JUDITH M. GLASSGOLD ET AL., AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, REPORT OF THE
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON APPROPRIATE
THERAPEUTIC RESPONSES TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION, 3–4 (2009) (synthesizing
psychological knowledge and recommending therapeutic approaches providing
acceptance and support).
347. See Jerry Brown, California Governor, Signs SB 1172, Bill Banning Gay
Conversion
Therapy
for
Minors,
HUFFINGTON
POST,
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/jerry-brown-sb-1172-gay-conversion-therapycalifornia_n_1926855 (last updated Feb. 2, 2016) (last visited Apr. 16, 2019)
(summarizing the types of therapy banned under the law and the public response
to the bill) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
348. See N.J. REV. STAT. § 45:1–55 (2013) (banning SOCE for minors); Martha
T. Moore, N.J. Gov. Christie Signs Ban on Gay Conversion Therapy, USA TODAY,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/08/19/chris-christie-gayconversion-therapy-new-jersey/2671197/ (last updated Aug. 19, 2013, 6:07 PM)
(last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (summarizing the types of therapy banned under the
law and the public response to the bill) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
349. See King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 220 (3d Cir. 2014)
(challenging New Jersey law prohibiting “licensed counselors from engaging in
‘sexual orientation change efforts’ with a client under the age of 18”); Pickup v.
Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1221 (9th Cir. 2014) (challenging California law
prohibiting “state-licensed mental health providers from engaging in ‘sexual
orientation change efforts’ with patients under 18 years of age”).
350. See King, 767 F.3d at 222 (summarizing the basis of plaintiffs’
allegations); Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1224–25 (summarizing the basis of plaintiffs’
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Circuit case, Pickup v. Brown,351 the court adopted a framework
resembling that proposed in the Eleventh Circuit’s second
Wollschlaeger opinion.352 Instead of a four-category grid, the Ninth
Circuit imagined a continuum.353 At one end was professional
speech within a public dialogue (the Eleventh Circuit’s category 1
and category 4 speech).354 At the continuum’s midpoint was speech
that occurs within a physician-patient relationship (the Eleventh
Circuit’s category 2 and category 3 speech), like that in Casey.355
And at the other end of the continuum was professional conduct,
which is not speech at all (off the Eleventh Circuit’s grid).356 The
Ninth Circuit concluded that SB 1172 regulated talk therapy as
medical conduct, not talk therapy as expressive speech.357
Unsurprisingly, that conclusion dictated rational basis review and
SB 1172 was upheld.358

allegations).
351. 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014).
352. See id. at 1227 (“In determining whether SB 1172 is a regulation of
speech or conduct, we find it helpful to view this issue along a continuum.”).
353. Id.
354. Compare Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1227 (using a continuum to analyze the
statute at issue), with Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d 859, 888 (11th Cir. 2015) (using
a four-category grid to analyze the statute at issue).
355. See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1228–29 (explaining the midpoint of the
continuum where certain limits on speech will be tolerated such that they fall
within “reasonable licensing and regulation by the State” of the practice of
medicine).
356. See id. at 1229 (explaining that the state has great power to regulate
professional conduct even though it may incidentally implicate a professional’s
speech).
357. See id. at 1229–30 (concluding California’s prohibition on sexual
orientation conversion therapy for minors was a Constitutional regulation of
professional conduct).
358. See id. at 1231–32 (“Because SB 1172 regulates only treatment, while
leaving mental health providers free to discuss and recommend, or recommend
against, SOCE, we conclude . . . that SB 1172 is subject to only rational basis
review.”).
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2. King v. Governor of New Jersey: The Third Circuit’s Approach
The Third Circuit heard King v. Governor of New Jersey359
almost six months after the Ninth Circuit decided Pickup.360 The
majority opinion opened similarly: “[T]he question we confront is
whether verbal communications become ‘conduct’ when they are
used as a vehicle for mental health treatment.”361 The District
Court had relied heavily on Pickup, and the Third Circuit also
considered the obvious parallels on appeal.362 But Circuit Judge
Smith, writing for a unanimous panel of three, found greater
alignment with Ninth Circuit Judge O’Scannlain, who had
dissented in Pickup, than with the majority.363 The Ninth Circuit’s
continuum was “nothing more than a ‘labeling game,’” lacking a
doctrinally sound methodology for separating protected speech
from unprotected conduct.364 Under such an approach, courts could
simply label unpopular speech “conduct” and do away with First
Amendment scrutiny.365 “Speech is speech,” Judge Smith
concluded, “and it must be analyzed as such.”366 In terms of the
level of scrutiny, however, the Third Circuit found professional
speech—though undoubtedly speech—was not comparable to pure
speech.367 It bore a greater resemblance to commercial speech.368
Both serve an “informational function” and both occur in
traditionally highly-regulated contexts.369 The Third Circuit thus
359. 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014).
360. See id. at 226–28 (summarizing and discussing Pickup).
361. See id. at 224.
362. See id. at 223–24 (summarizing the New Jersey district court’s
application of Pickup).
363. See id. at 227–28 (summarizing O’Scannlain’s dissent in Pickup).
364. See id. (quoting Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014)
(O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)).
365. See id. at 229 (explaining that “[b]y labeling certain communications as
“conduct,” thereby assuring that they receive no First Amendment protection at
all”).
366. Id.
367. See id. at 230–31 (explaining that appeals courts have interpreted the
Supreme Court’s Casey decision as “establish[ing] special rules for the regulation
of speech that occurs pursuant to the practice of a licensed profession”).
368. See id. at 234 (“We believe that commercial and professional speech
share important qualities. . . .”).
369. See id. (determining that professional speech is similar to commercial
speech and thus applying intermediate scrutiny).
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applied commercial speech’s intermediate scrutiny.370 Given the
empirical evidence in the legislative record (demonstrating a
dearth of credible evidence of SOCE’s efficacy), and given the
special vulnerability of the population (minors) New Jersey’s ban
was designed to protect, the court concluded that A3371 “directly
advances New Jersey’s stated interest in protecting minor citizens
from harmful professional practices,” via sufficiently tailored
means.371
Though both California’s and New Jersey’s SOCE bans were
upheld, the Ninth and Third Circuits each applied different levels
of judicial scrutiny.372 Moreover, both circuits adopted approaches
not wholly consistent with the final Wollschlaeger opinion.373
C. Abortion Sequelae
Ultrasound imaging has been a component of pregnancy care
in the Western world for decades, and standard since at least
1978.374 In the early 1980s, pro-life advocates identified the
technology as an opportunity for abortion deterrence.375 The
370. See id.
371. See id. at 239–40 (applying intermediate scrutiny analysis to the New
Jersey statue banning sexual orientation conversion therapy).
372. See King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 234 (3d Cir. 2014)
(determining that intermediate scrutiny is the proper standard of review); Pickup
v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1231–32 (9th Cir. 2014) (determining that rational basis
review is the proper standard of review).
373. In fact, the King court cited with approval the Eleventh Circuit’s first
Wollschlaeger opinion, which was, of course, vacated and replaced three times.
King, 767 F.3d at 231–32 (citing Wollschlaeger II, 760 F.3d 1195, 1207 (11th Cir.
2014)).
374. See Gillian Harris et al., “Seeing the Baby”: Pleasures and Dilemmas of
Ultrasound Technologies for Primiparous Australian Women, 18 MED.
ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 23, 24 (2004) (evaluating the use of ultrasound during
pregnancy) (citing Ann Oakley, The History of Ultrasonography in Obstetrics, 13
BIRTH 8 (1986)).
375. See, e.g., Robert M. Godzeno, The Role of Ultrasound Imaging in
Informed Consent Legislation Post-Gonzales v. Carhart, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
285, 303 & n.127 (2009) (citing Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La.
1984) which struck down pre-abortion mandatory ultrasound law); THE SILENT
SCREAM (American Portrait Films 1984) (depicting the abortion process via
ultrasound).
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strategy hinges on the contested assumption that ultrasound
examinations are emotionally-laden events for all pregnant
women.376 There is evidence to suggest that the viewing of an
ultrasound does have a positive impact on maternal-fetal
attachment—in wanted pregnancies.377 Research suggests the
impact is greater the earlier the ultrasound is performed.378
However, there is also a substantial body of research suggesting
that ultrasounds have a varied impact in the abortion context. A
2012 study indicated that in the case of unwanted pregnancy,
many women do not consider an ultrasound helpful to their
decision-making.379 In fact, a 2014 analysis of over 15,000
pregnancies showed that 98.4% of abortion-seekers proceed to
termination even after viewing an ultrasound.380 Another study,
again using a dataset of more than 15,000 abortion care visits from
2011, demonstrated that most women would decline to view the
ultrasound image.381 Of course, given a mandatory
speech-and-display ultrasound law, declining is not an option.382
376. See Godzeno, supra note 375, at 287 (describing the three types of laws
promulgated by states requiring women to receive an ultrasound “before [the]
woman can give informed consent to an abortion”).
377. See Lisa M. Mitchell, Women’s Experiences of Unexpected Ultrasound
Findings, 49 J. MIDWIFERY & WOMEN’S HEALTH 228, 232 (2004) (suggesting that
seeing an image on screen “can make its existence ‘real’”); B. Sedgmen et al., The
Impact of Two-Dimensional Versus Three-Dimensional Ultrasound Exposure on
Maternal-Fetal Attachment and Maternal Health Behavior in Pregnancy, 27
ULTRASOUND OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 245, 250 (2006) (exploring the effects
that viewing ultrasounds can have on a mother’s behavior during pregnancy);
Claude Villeneuve et al., Psychological Aspects of Ultrasound Imaging During
Pregnancy, 33 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 530, 534 (1988) (“The exam had a positive effect
[on expectant parents] and seemed to enhance bonding.”).
378. See Sedgmen et al., supra note 377 (discussing findings consistent with
a positive impact and stating that “impact is greatest earlier in pregnancy”).
379. See Katrina Kimport et al., Women’s Perspectives on Ultrasound Viewing
in the Abortion Care Context, 22 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES e513, e517 (2012)
(summarizing the results of twenty interviews conducted with women who
received ultrasounds when seeking an abortion).
380. See Mary Gatter et al., Relationship Between Ultrasound Viewing and
Proceeding to Abortion, 123 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 81, 85 (2014) (finding that
viewing an ultrasound had a limited effect on a woman’s choice to seek an
abortion).
381. See Katrina Kimport et al., Patient Viewing of the Ultrasound Image
Prior to Abortion, 88 CONCEPTION 666, 668 (2013) (summarizing the results of a
study investigating ultrasound usage when a woman is seeking an abortion).
INST.,
382. See
Requirements
for
Ultrasound,
GUTTMACHER
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Whatever the actual deterrent effect of such laws, more than half
of the states regulate pre-abortion ultrasounds.383 Three states
have passed so-called speech-and-display laws, the most
aggressive form of ultrasound regulation.384
1. Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services.
v. Lakey: The Fifth Circuit’s Approach
In 2011, the Texas State Legislature amended its 2003
Woman’s Right to Know Act (WRTK)385 to include a
speech-and-display provision. Styled as an informed consent
safeguard, House Bill 15 required physicians to:
perform[] a sonogram on the pregnant woman on whom the
abortion is to be performed; display[] the sonogram images in a
quality consistent with current medical practice in a manner
that the pregnant woman may view them; . . . provide[], in a
manner understandable to a layperson, a verbal explanation of
the results of the sonogram images . . . [and to] make audible
the heart auscultation for the pregnant woman to hear, if
present, in a quality consistent with current medical practice
and provide[], in a manner understandable to a layperson, a
simultaneous verbal explanation of the heart auscultation[.]386

H.B. 15 did not allow pregnant women, absent incest or rape,
to decline a sonogram or opt not to hear the heartbeat and
explanation of the sonogram images.387 The Act mandated denial

https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/requirements-ultrasound (last
updated Apr. 1, 2019) (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (stating that three states have
mandatory ultrasound laws) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
383. See id. (stating that twenty-six states regulate the provision of
ultrasound by abortion providers).
384. See id. (“[Three] states mandate that an abortion provider perform an
ultrasound on each woman seeking an abortion and requires the provider to show
and describe the image.”).
385. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4)(A)–(D) (West,
Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
386. Id.
387. See id. § 171.012(a)(5) (providing a required medical form which informs
a pregnant woman that she must hear the explanation of the sonogram images).
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or revocation of a physician’s medical license for failure to
comply.388
Texas physicians and abortion providers immediately
challenged H.B. 15 on First Amendment grounds.389 The District
Court granted a preliminary injunction.390 On the State’s appeal,
the Fifth Circuit ordered expedited briefing and oral argument to
consider whether Texas’s speech-and-display provisions were
substantively different than the provisions upheld in Casey.391 Like
Pennsylvania’s informed consent statute, H.B. 15 compelled
physicians to deliver “medically accurate depictions.”392 Unlike
Pennsylvania’s law, however, H.B. 15’s mode of delivery was,
Appellees argued, “qualitatively different.”393 In Casey, the
Supreme Court upheld a law dictating a passive information
exchange— i.e., Pennsylvania physicians were only required to
make certain materials “available” to abortion-seekers.394 But H.B.
15 not only compelled Texas physicians to verbally deliver
information themselves, but also compelled pregnant women to
listen.395 Moreover, the law dictated the context and content of the
conversation such that the information exchange amounted to
advocacy, making physicians the “‘mouthpiece’ of the state.”396 The
Fifth Circuit disagreed.397 The information delivered via sonogram
388. See TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 164.055(a) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg.
Sess.) (providing the punishment for failure to comply with TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 171.012).
389. See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 806 F.
Supp. 2d 942, 947–48 (W.D. Tex. 2011) (challenging H.B. 15 for “compelling
physicians and patients to engage in government-mandated speech and
expression”), vacated in part, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012).
390. See id. at 977 (granting preliminary injunction).
391. See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d
570, 574–75 (5th Cir. 2012) (discussing the similarities between the Pennsylvania
law upheld in Casey with the Texas law).
392. See id. at 577 (describing the requirements of the Texas law).
393. See id. at 578–79 (summarizing the appellee’s argument).
394. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992)
(“This requirement cannot be considered a substantial obstacle to obtaining an
abortion, and, it follows, there is no undue burden.”).
395. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(5) (requiring the
pregnant woman to hear an explanation of the sonogram images).
396. See Lakey, 667 F.3d at 579 (addressing appellees’ criticism of the Texas
law).
397. See id. (articulating that Casey does not provide the “ceiling” of what can
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was not “different in kind” from the disclosures in Casey.398 Rather,
the information was of the same kind—i.e., medically accurate,
inherently truthful, and non-misleading.399 The only difference
between the Pennsylvania law and H.B. 15 was that H.B. 15 called
for “more graphic and scientifically up-to-date information.”400 The
Fifth Circuit concluded that in terms of constitutional analysis, the
mode of delivery was immaterial.401 The court applied Casey-level
scrutiny (a standard it referred to as “the antithesis of strict
scrutiny”)402 and upheld H.B. 15.403 By the majority’s reasoning,
then, compelled speech—so long as it is medically accurate—is not
subject to heightened scrutiny.404 Indeed, as Circuit Judge
Higginbotham noted in his Lakey concurrence, if the challenged
law compels accurate speech, it need only meet a minimum
threshold of rationality.405 In the Fifth Circuit, medically accurate
compelled speech is closer to professional conduct than speech.406
be required of medical providers).
398. See id. at 578 (“They are not different in kind, although more graphic
and scientifically up-to-date, than the disclosures discussed in Casey.”).
399. See id. at 578–79 (describing the required disclosures as “the epitome of
truthful”).
400. See id. at 578 (“They are not different in kind, although more graphic
and scientifically up-to-date, than the disclosures discussed in Casey.”).
401. See id. at 579 (stating that the mode of delivery did not make a
“constitutionally significant” difference). Whether the “mode of delivery”
matters—and more specifically, whether there is a constitutional difference
between prohibited speech (as in Wollschlaeger, Pickup, and King) and compelled
speech (as in Lakey and Camnitz) remains unclear, even after Becerra. See Nat’l
Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2387–88 (2018)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (decrying “the majority’s reliance on cases that prohibit
rather than require speech” because compelled disclosures, even if controversial,
are less likely to suppress the “marketplace of ideas” than prohibitions).
402. See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d
570, 575 (5th Cir. 2012) (discussing the standard of review applied in Casey).
403. See id. at 584 (“Appellees failed to demonstrate constitutional flaws in
H.B. 15.”).
404. See id. (determining that the appellees were unlikely to succeed on their
First Amendment claims).
405. See id. at 585 (Higgenbotham, J., concurring) (stating that H.B. 15’s
validity requires only “a legislative judgment that is at least rational”).
406. See id. at 584 (stating that appellees failed to show a constitutional flaw
in the Texas law).
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2. Stuart v. Camnitz: The Fourth Circuit’s Approach
The same year that Texas passed H.B. 15, North Carolina
introduced its own speech-and-display law.407 Its provisions were
near identical.408 The Real-Time View Requirement (RTV)409 of
North Carolina’s Woman’s Right to Know Act required abortion
providers to “perform an obstetric real-time view of the unborn
child” and “provide a simultaneous explanation of what the display
is depicting.”410 Interestingly, the drafters also included a caveat:
“Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent a pregnant
woman from averting her eyes form the displayed images or from
refusing to hear the simultaneous explanation.”411 The
certification proviso dictated that pregnant women verify
compliance with the RTV in writing, and, further, that they
indicate whether they had averted their eyes.412
As in Texas, physicians and abortion providers successfully
sought a permanent injunction.413 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
assessed the District Court’s application of intermediate
scrutiny.414 The court acknowledged that the RTV regulated both
speech and conduct and even agreed with the Fifth Circuit’s
characterization of it as “the epitome of truthful, non-misleading
information.”415 It did not, however, view medical accuracy as the
conclusive element.416 That the RTV compelled speech dealing in
407. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(1)–(2) (Westlaw through S.L. 2018-145))
(requiring certain steps be taken by medical providers prior to an abortion).
408. Compare id. (requiring medical providers to take certain steps prior to
an abortion), with TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(5) (West,
Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) (same).
409. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(1)–(2).
410. Id.
411. Id. § 90-21.85(b).
412. See id. § 90-21.85(a)(5) (requiring women to attest to aspects of the
medical treatment before receiving an abortion).
413. See Stuart v. Loomis (Stuart I), 992 F. Supp. 2d 585, 611 (M.D.N.C. 2014)
(ordering a permanent injunction of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85).
414. See Stuart v. Camnitz (Stuart II), 774 F.3d 238, 245 (4th Cir. 2014)
(agreeing with the lower court’s choice to apply intermediate scrutiny).
415. See id. at 246 (determining that compelling speech requires a speaker “to
change the content of his speech or even to say something where he would
otherwise be silent” (quoting Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. V.
Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577–78 (5th Cir. 2012)).
416. See id. (discussing the medical accuracy of the procedure).
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facts versus opinions did not “divorce the speech from its moral or
ideological implications.”417 To the court’s mind, wholly factual
information—if compelled at a time “when the intended recipient
is most vulnerable,”— constitutes a “plainly [] expressive act.”418
The Fourth Circuit also disagreed with the Fifth (and Ninth)
Circuit’s rational basis review.419 “With respect,” Circuit Judge
Wilkinson intoned, “our sister circuits read too much into
Casey.”420 Even if Casey had dictated rational basis as the standard
for all informed consent provisos in the abortion context—a claim
the Fourth Circuit considered dubious421—the RTV did not
resemble the Casey statute.422 Pennsylvania had legislated only
modest deviations from traditional informed consent. By contrast,
North Carolina had legislated that doctors recite information, even
when the recipient “has through ear and eye covering rendered
herself temporarily deaf and blind.”423 Moreover, even if a woman
elected against the “embarrassing spectacle” of blindfolding and
ear-muffing, the Fourth Circuit felt that compelling delivery via
the physician’s own voice was especially coercive.424 More than
anything, the Fourth Circuit’s opinion stressed that “context
matters.”425 The RTV “finds the patient half-naked or disrobed on
her back on an examination table, with an ultrasound probe either
on her belly or inserted into her vagina.”426 In such a context,
417. Id.
418. See id. at 245–46 (assessing the act of showing the pregnant woman
images of her scans).
419. Id. at 249.
420. Id. Judge Wilkerson also suggested the Eighth Circuit was guilty of the
same misreading in Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota
v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Stuart II, 774 F.3d at 248–49
(citing Lakey and Rounds with disapproval).
421. See id. (stating that Casey “hardly announces a guiding standard of
scrutiny for use in every subsequent compelled speech case involving abortion”).
422. See id. (discussing the differences between RTV and the Casey statute).
423. Id. at 252.
424 See id. at 253 (“We can perceive no benefit to state interests from walling
off patients and physicians in a manner antithetical to the very communication
that lies at the heart of the informed consent process.”).
425. See id. at 247–48 (discussing a wholistic assessment of the North
Carolina statute).
426. See id. at 255 (describing the patient’s vulnerable position).
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compelled speech could hardly be anything other than
constitutionally infirm.427 The Fourth Circuit held that the RTV
did not survive even intermediate scrutiny—let alone strict, which
was arguably the more appropriate standard.428
D. Conclusions and Future Applications
There is nothing even approaching judicial consensus on
professional speech—not in definition, not in application, and
certainly not doctrinally.429 The Eleventh Circuit applies
intermediate scrutiny (and leaves open the possibility for strict) to
physician speech restrictions—at least in the context of gun
violence.430 The Ninth Circuit applies rational basis scrutiny—but
likely only in the context of sexual orientation conversion efforts.431
The Third Circuit applies intermediate scrutiny—but its
commercial speech analogy likely precludes the possibility of
stricter applications in other contexts.432 The Fifth Circuit applies
rational basis with enough robust confidence to suggest it would
427. See id. (discussing how the context of the speech affects the informed
consent assessment).
428. See id. at 248, 250–53 (affirming the lower court’s decisions that §
90-21.85 of the North Carolina General Statutes violates the First Amendment).
429. Compare Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667
F.3d 570, 574–75 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding a Texas law requiring certain speech
of professionals), with Stuart II, 774 F.3d 238, 245 (4th Cir. 2014) (striking a
North Carolina statute compelling professional speech).
430. See Wollschlaeger V, 848 F.3d 1293, 1319 (11th Cir. 2017) (upholding a
Florida statute that discouraged medical personnel from inquiring of a patient
about firearms).
431. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit did not apply rational basis in Becerra. In
applying intermediate scrutiny, the court responded to the Fourth Circuit’s jab in
Stuart II: “Casey’s short discussion of a physician’s First Amendment rights in
the context of abortion means only what it says—that there was no violation of
the physicians’ First Amendment rights given the particular facts of Casey. We
need not ‘read too much’ into Casey’s statement . . . .” Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life
Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 838 (2016) (citations omitted). Notably, the
Ninth Circuit did not retreat from its Pickup analysis, even as it applied higher
scrutiny to abortion-specific speech restrictions. See id. at 839 (distinguishing
from Pickup by stating “Pickup, however, never discussed the level of scrutiny
appropriate for speech that fell at the midpoint”).
432. See King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 220 (3d Cir. 2014)
(challenging New Jersey law prohibiting “licensed counselors from engaging in
‘sexual orientation change efforts’ with a client under the age of 18”).
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do so in any context.433 Finally, the Fourth Circuit, like the
Eleventh, applies intermediate scrutiny with the possibility for
strict, at least in the abortion context.434
The absence of clear legal guidelines in an area so ideologically
charged as abortion suggests that legislatures will feel, as they
have historically, emboldened to take speech-restricting
liberties.435 Further, the Supreme Court’s most recent guidance
prescribes “application of so broad and obscure a standard,” “[it]
threats to create serious problems.”436 With PWGS on the horizon,
it is both critical to predict the foreseeable likelihood of state
intervention in physician-patient conversations, and to anticipate
the constitutional concerns triggered by such interventions.437
V. “Context Matters”: Prenatal Whole Genome Sequencing
The practice of prenatal medicine is changing. Until the late
1980s, women did not begin making decisions until months into
pregnancy,438 and their decision-making was facilitated by
multiple and unfettered exchanges of information with their
provider.439 Today, with rapid clinical uptake of new technologies,
the timeline for prenatal decision-making is earlier. Obtaining
fetal information is easier.440 For both mother and child, the tests
433. See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d
570, 574–75 (5th Cir. 2012) (defending a challenge to a Texas statute for
compelling physicians to engage in speech).
434. See Stuart II, 774 F.3d 238, 245 (4th Cir. 2014) (agreeing with the lower
court’s choice to apply intermediate scrutiny to a North Carolina law requiring
certain speech of medical providers).
435. See id.
436. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2388
(2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
437. See sources cited supra note 9 (suggesting and discussing the eventual
routinization of PWGS).
438. Amniocentesis is routinely unavailable until the second trimester.
ACOG, Practice Bulletin No. 162, supra note 76, at e111.
439. See discussion supra Part II (discussing changes in prenatal genetics as
exemplifying the rapid changes in prenatal care).
440. See discussion supra Part II.A–C (exploring the evolution to prenatal
whole-genome sequencing).
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are safer.441 But an evolution in medical practice has not produced
an evolution in political thought. Far from moderating the abortion
debate, the influx of technology has only amplified the motivation
of conservative legislators.442 In a practical sense, of course, state
laws like North Dakota’s are unenforceable.443 Under the Supreme
Court’s viability standard, a woman’s right to choose is inviolable
until at least twenty-three weeks of gestation.444 As a matter of
federal law, a woman may choose to terminate for any reason—be
it preference, convenience, or no reason at all.445 Certainly, she is
entitled to terminate on the basis of a genetic abnormality, even in
North Dakota.446 But that ABGAs are legally unenforceable says
little about their symbolic power. Indeed, their most damaging
effects are of two kinds: normative and precedential.
A. Existing Hardship: The Normative Effect of ABGAs
As they are written, ABGAs target specific action. They
prohibit physicians only from performing abortions “with
knowledge that the pregnant woman is seeking an abortion solely
because the unborn child has been diagnosed with either a genetic
abnormality or a potential for a genetic abnormality.”447 But the
effect is not limited to circumscription of the specific action. The
practical effect is a global undermining of the physician-patient
relationship—subtle discouragement of frank and open
communication.448 It does not take any special acuity for a
441. See Dennis, supra note 77, 485–86 (discussing a new method for
collecting fetal DNA).
442. See discussion supra Part IV.C (discussing judicial challenges to various
state statutes which sought to regulate physician speech in the abortion context).
443. See H.B. 1305, 63d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2012) (outlawing
abortions “because the unborn child has been diagnosed with either a genetic
abnormality or a potential for a genetic abnormality”).
444. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837, 933 n.6
(1992) (“The joint opinion agrees with Roe’s conclusion that viability occurs at 23
or 24 weeks at the earliest.”).
445. See id. at 860–61 (discussing “that viability marks the earliest point at
which the State's interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a
legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions”).
446. See id. (discussing a woman’s right to an abortion pre-viability).
447. H.B. 1305, 63d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2012).
448. See Stuart II, 774 F.3d 238, 253(4th Cir. 2014) (determining that the
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physician to realize that the easiest way to avoid running afoul of
North Dakota’s dictate is to simply not ask questions.449 At an
extreme, the legislative discouragement might manifest as a
decision to selectively discuss testing options—or to abandon the
genetic testing discussion altogether.450 Of course, from the
patient’s perspective, too, the disincentive is equally clear: “if a
medical professional can ‘turn her in’ for wanting an abortion,”451
she has no incentive whatsoever to discuss either her available
options or her ultimate choice.452 Writ large, the erosion of
communication channels is sure to have damaging normative
effects.453 ABGAs are clearly benign only insofar as they are
ignored—that is, insofar as patients and physicians resist the
legislative invitation to silence. But in light of physicians’
pre-existing discomfort with genetic conversations, and patients’
awareness that abortion is a charged issue, the invitation might
prove irresistible.454
In their historical context, ABGAs might be viewed as a
continuation of pro-lifers’ general strategy—yet another hardship
construction project. As in previous projects—mandatory waiting
periods, hospital-admitting requirements, insurance restrictions,
etc.—the legislative intent is clear. ABGAs target the pregnant
patient. They do so indirectly, via circumscription of the
physician’s action, but the ultimate goal is to prevent women from
making certain choices.455 ABGAs seek to limit, however
unenforceable, the woman’s constitutional rights. But in the
modern context, against the nebulous backdrop of professional
speech required of physicians was coercive of the patient).
449. See H.B. 1305, 63d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2012) (regulating a
physician’s actions when assisting patients seeking an abortion).
450. See id. (setting requirements for physicians assisting patients seeking
abortions).
451. See Stefanija Giric, Strange Bedfellows: Anti-Abortion and Disability
Rights Advocacy, 3 J. LAW BIOSCIS. 736, 740 (2016) (stating that such knowledge
will disincentivize the patient from discussing the abortion decision).
452. See Giric, supra note 451, 739–40 (discussing how certain laws
discourage women from discussing medical decisions with their physicians).
453. See id.
454. See id.
455. See id.
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speech doctrine, ABGAs might be alternatively viewed as a
successful first step. If North Dakota can dictate the reasons for
which an abortion can be performed, and Texas can compel
physicians to make statements designed to discourage
abortion-seekers,456 it is not unimaginable that state legislatures
might next prohibit abortion-motivating communications
altogether. If professional speech is treated as low-value—or
worse, is not recognized as “speech” in the legal sense of that
word—ABGAs are anything but benign. They are the precursors
to laws that would regulate the content of genetic testing
discussions.
B. Imagining Future Hardship: The Precedential Effect of ABGAs
It is not difficult to predict what future laws might look like.
Conceivably, they might be drafted as compelled speech provisions
resembling the speech-and-display laws passed in Texas and
North Carolina. They might, for instance, compel physicians to tell
patients that PWGS can be used to diagnose conditions X, Y, and
Z. Without a scientific understanding of genetics and sequencing
technology, and absent a more nuanced discussion with their
doctor, a patient might reasonably believe that the technology is
capable of diagnosing only X, Y, and Z—when the reality is that
these tests are capable of assessing the entire alphabet.
Alternatively, a legislature might draft speech prohibitions
resembling Florida’s Firearms Owners’ Privacy Act. Such a law
might prohibit physicians from offering patients certain kinds of
testing (e.g., testing for adult-onset, nonmedical, or aesthetic
traits), or from otherwise communicating with patients about a
proscribed topic (i.e., PWGS). A third possibility might be a state
initiative resembling the SOCE bans upheld in California and New
Jersey.457 At this extreme, future genetic testing laws might
foreclose not only the offer of PWGS, but the ordering of genetic
tests during pregnancy altogether. Finally, legislatures might
adopt an approach that has already proven successful. In the
abortion context, TRAP laws—targeted regulations of abortion
456.
457.

See supra Part IV.C.1.
See supra Part IV.B.
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providers—are legislative impediments intended to drive down
abortion rates.458 For example, many states make the legal
performance of an abortion contingent on the physical space
providers occupy, requiring abortion facilities be equipped with
extensive neonatal units,459 with procedure rooms of a specified
size, or even with corridors of specified widths.460 Making the
performance of an abortion contingent on the provider having
hospital admitting privileges is an especially popular strategy.
Currently, eleven states require that providers have an affiliation
with a local hospital,461 despite the fact that post-abortion
complications requiring hospital care occur at a rate of less than
one percent.462 In the PWGS context, legislatures might similarly
implement TRAP-style restrictions such that a physician’s ability
to order PWGS for a patient that is contingent on medically
unnecessary and functionally onerous requirements. The
implication of any one of these potential regulatory moves, of
course, is that it is appropriate for legislatures to narrow the
decision-making options for any given family. More broadly, the
implication is that politicians, rather than medical professionals,
are best qualified to answer medical questions. The unavoidable
result if any of these laws were passed would be an unequivocal
loss of patients’ decision-making power and physicians’ freedom of
speech.

458. See sources cited supra note 37 (examining TRAP laws).
459. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-3 (LexisNexis 2018) (setting
conditions for abortions post-viability); H.B. 4146, 2015 Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Mich. 2015) (proposing neonatal unit requirement).
460. Nine states regulate the size of abortion procedure rooms and seven
states regulate the width of corridors in facilities where abortions are performed.
Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE,
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/targeted-regulation-abortionproviders (last updated Apr. 1, 2019) (last visited Apr. 16, 2019 (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
461. Id.
462. Laura Kurtzman, Major Complication Rate After Abortion Is Extremely
NEWS
CTR.
(Dec.
8,
2014),
Low,
Study
Shows,
UCSF
https://www.ucsf.edu/news/2014/12/121781/major-complication-rate-afterabortion-extremely-low-study-shows (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Predicting judicial intervention, however, is far easier than
predicting legislative action. The law, for all its failings, is an
iterative instrument— courts rarely approach problems, even new
problems, with an entirely new methodology. For this reason, the
physician speech cases recently decided in the Eleventh, Ninth,
Fifth, Fourth, and Third Circuits likely represent the spectrum of
possible judicial approaches with respect to future PWGS
legislation. As it stands, given a speech-specific law and a
responsive First Amendment challenge, the question a court will
always answer is this: how valuable is physician speech? If the
answer to this question is “low,” then the approaches adopted by
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits are appropriate and we should expect
courts to apply rational basis review.463 If rational basis is the
appropriate test, we should expect legislatures to feel, rightly,
empowered to compel, prohibit, and direct physician speech as they
see fit. There is, however, good reason to suspect that physician
speech is anything but low-value.
The original doctrine underlying First Amendment protection
is helpful scaffolding for assigning value to physician speech in
modern medicine. An argument that physician speech is not
low-value suggests, doctrinally, that it must therefore be either: (1)
inherently valuable as a conduit for self-expression, or (2)
instrumentally valuable as a tool to accomplish something else. In
the United States, medicine is not an expressive profession—at
least not in the way acting, creative writing, or fashion design are.
American medicine is a professional practice rather than an
artistic pursuit, which makes claims of inherent value
conceptually difficult. When physicians act or speak, we do not ask
if what they have done is beautiful. We ask if they have met the
practice guidelines for good medicine. We ask if they have helped
the patient. This distinction is significant. Indeed, it seems to be
the driving rationale behind, for example, the Ninth Circuit’s
approach to SOCE bans.464 The court’s conclusion in Pickup v.
Brown was that California’s SB 1172 regulated medical conduct,
not expressive speech.465 By categorizing physician speech as
463. See supra Part IV.C.; IV.B.
464. See supra Part IV.B.1.
465. See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1221 (9th Cir. 2014) (challenging
California law prohibiting “state-licensed mental health providers from engaging
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non-expressive, as conduct within a professional practice, the court
rejected the inherent value of physician speech as a conduit for
self-expression.466 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Lakey
followed from its conclusion that medically accurate speech was
closer to professional conduct than expressive speech and was
therefore not entitled to heightened scrutiny.467
But to conclude that physician speech is low-value because it
is not inherently valuable as a conduit for self-expression ignores
entirely the possibility that it might be instrumentally high-value
as a tool to accomplish something else—namely, good medicine.
Indeed, the instrumental value of physician speech seems to have
been the focus of Eleventh Circuit Judge Wilson’s numerous
dissents in the Wollschlaeger litigation.468 The Eleventh Circuit’s
final opinion—that firearm inquiries would not lead to the practice
of bad medicine—was focused entirely on instrumental value.469
The Third Circuit, too, found that physician speech has at least
medium-value because it serves an “informational function” for
patients.470 And the Fourth Circuit, of course, went further than
both the Third and Eleventh Circuits in finding that physician
speech is both instrumentally valuable and inherently valuable as
a “plainly expressive act.”471
American medicine may not be an expressive profession. But
it is absolutely an instrumentally valuable one. In the United
States, medicine is highly regulated because we are, as a nation,
in ‘sexual orientation change efforts’ with patients under 18 years of age”).
466. See id. at 1227 (evaluating the statute at issue’s implication for physician
speech).
467. See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d
570, 572 (5th Cir. 2012) (challenging a Texas statue for its effect on physician
speech).
468. See Wollschlaeger V, 848 F.3d 1293, 1300 (11th Cir. 2017) (addressing
the challenge to a Florida statute regulating physician speech regarding
firearms).
469. See id. at 1318 (addressing the challenge to a Florida statute regulating
physician speech regarding firearms).
470. See supra notes 368–371 and accompanying text (explaining that
professional speech, like commercial speech, serves as an important channel for
the communication of information that might otherwise never reach the public).
471. See supra text accompanying notes 414–416.
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concerned with empowering patients. If a surgeon performs an
unnecessary surgery without the patient’s consent, it is no defense
for the surgeon to say that her diagnosis was elegant or that her
sutures were a work of art. We believe that safeguarding patient
autonomy ensures the practice of “good medicine.” To that end, we
have enshrined in law principles like informed consent and the
right to refuse treatment.472 If we assume, as the Third, Fourth,
and Eleventh Circuits do, that open communication between
patients and their doctors is integral to patient autonomy—
integral, that is, to the practice of good medicine—then physician
speech is at least medium-value.473 Indeed, insofar as it promotes
informed decision-making, physician speech is high-value, and
rational basis review is wholly inappropriate.474 If physician
speech is valuable—possibly, very valuable—then intermediate
scrutiny is the constitutional floor and strict scrutiny is the ceiling.
VI. Conclusion
The lower courts have repeatedly approached the problem of
identifying professional speech by attempting to differentiate
“medical conduct” from physician speech.475 In Becerra, the
Supreme Court addressed the question by suggesting that
physician speech should be considered speech under the First
Amendment when “it is tied to a [medical] procedure.”476 By that
definition, the majority reasoned, disclosures of the type
challenged in Casey withstand constitutional scrutiny because
472. See Piechan, supra note 12 (discussing informed consent in the context
of genetic testing).
473. See, e.g., Wollschlaeger V, 848 F.3d 1293, 1316 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he
American Medical Association and the American Academy of Pediatrics each
recommend that doctors and pediatricians routinely ask patients about firearm
ownership, and educate them about the dangers posed to children by firearms
that are not safely secured”).
474. See, e.g., id. at 1311 (“[W]e do not think it is appropriate to subject
content-based restrictions on speech by those engaged in a certain profession to
mere rational basis review.”).
475. See, e.g., Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1229–30 (9th Cir. 2014)
(concluding California’s prohibition on sexual orientation conversion therapy for
minors was a Constitutional regulation of professional conduct).
476. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2369
(2018).
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they facilitate informed consent for a medical procedure (i.e., an
abortion).477 By contrast, the notices challenged in Becerra were
struck down for lacking a sufficient connection to a medical
procedure.478 But notably, the Court did not indicate how close a
connection is needed to pass constitutional muster nor did it
provide a framework for identifying what counts as a “connection”
in the first place. As Justice Breyer’s dissent quickly pointed out,
if Pennsylvania can require disclosures about adoption to get an
abortion (as in Casey), why can’t California require disclosures
about abortion to get prenatal or reproductive care (as in
Becerra)?479
It seems likely that the problem is in the question itself.
Courts should not be asking: Is this medical conduct or “speech as
speech”? Rather, the more appropriate question is: Does treating
physician speech as conduct—in essence, does treating physician
speech as low-value—lead to the practice of good medicine? Once
that question is raised, proposing a coherent definition for
professional speech is far easier. Physician speech is professional
speech—not medical conduct—when treating it as such promotes
patient safety, occurs within the confines of a doctor-patient
relationship, and is supported by evidence-based medicine. When
these three criteria are met, physician speech is high-value—and
the tests designed for high-value speech apply. Of course, there
remain definitional questions about how promotion of patient
safety ought to be quantified, how a doctor-patient relationship
ought to be recognized, and how much evidence (and of what type)
demonstrates evidence-based medicine. While such questions are
beyond the scope of this Article, the proposed definition
nonetheless suggests the same conclusion: rational basis review is
wholly inappropriate for professional speech—and for physician
speech, especially.

477. See id. at 2373 (comparing the disclosures required in a California
statute with similar disclosures required by a Pennsylvania statute in Casey).
478. See id. at 2375 (“[T]he licensed notice is not sufficiently drawn to achieve
it”).
479. See id. at 2283 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

